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Abstract
Reconfigurable Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem
Aarti Malik
Supervising Professor: Dr. P. Reddy
Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (ECC) have been proposed as an alternative to other
established public key cryptosystems such as RSA (Rivest Shamir Adleman). ECC
provide more security per bit than other known public key schemes based on the discrete
logarithm problem. Smaller key sizes result in faster computations, lower power
consumption and memory and bandwidth savings, thus making ECC a fast, flexible and
cost-effective solution for providing security in constrained environments. Implementing
ECC on reconfigurable platform combines the speed, security and concurrency of
hardware along with the flexibility of the software approach.
This work proposes a generic architecture for elliptic curve cryptosystem on a Field
Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) that performs an elliptic curve scalar multiplication in
1 r\~K
1 . 1 6milliseconds for GF (2 ), which is considerably faster than most other documented
implementations. One of the benefits of the proposed processor architecture is that it is
easily reprogrammable to use different algorithms and is adaptable to any field order.
Also through reconfiguration the arithmetic unit can be optimized for different area/speed
requirements. The mathematics involved uses binary extension field of the form GF (2n)
as the underlying field and polynomial basis for the representation of the elements in the
field. A significant gain in performance is obtained by using projective coordinates for
the points on the curve during the computation process.
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Chapter 1
Reconfigurable Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
1.1 Introduction
This thesis involves implementing an elliptic curve cryptosystem on an FPGA (Field
Programmable Gate Array). The design and algorithm are proposed to provide faster
security mechanism than any other known public key scheme, and is targeted for use in
constrained environments like mobile devices and smart cards.
Data communication in an open environment poses a threat to its users by compromising
the security of every transaction. It is very important to maintain the security, integrity
and validity of such transactions. Various cryptosystems have been established to ensure
information security. RSA (Rivest Shamir Adleman) is one the most popular public key
cryptosystem in use today [PIEOO] and is based on the integer factorization problem.
Elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) was proposed as an alternative to RSA and other
public key schemes like Elgamal encryption and Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA),
based on the integer factorization or the discrete logarithm problem.
Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems have been standardized by NIST (National Institute of
Standards and Technology) [NIST94] for use as a public key scheme. The US
government has also adopted ECC for the elliptic curve DSA [USGOO]. This
cryptosystem is built of complex mathematical operations that are implemented over
finite group of numbers. Elliptic curve groups over finite fields (finite field is a group of
elements satisfying certain mathematical properties) are very efficient for cryptographic
implementations [SIM92]. Also the representation ofelements in the finite field, which in
this case are the points on the elliptic curve, plays a very important part in determining
the ease of implementation [CERTOO].
The strength ofECC is based on the intractability of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm
problem, which is composed of the group operation of elliptic curves i.e., the elliptic
curve scalar or point multiplication. There is no deterministic time algorithm to solve the
elliptic curve discrete logarithm [MEN95]. Most algorithms take exponential time to
compute the discrete logarithm, using many supercomputers, and the data is generally
obsolete by then [MEN95].
An architecture for an elliptic curve processor is proposed in this work, which is capable
ofperforming the elliptic curve point multiplication operation in the fields GF (2m). The
architecture of the processor is versatile and can adapt to any field order depending on the
level of security required (higher field orders tend to offer more security). It is a low-
power processor suited for devices with limited energy resources. Another feature is that
all the operations for point multiplication are implemented on the chip resulting in lower
input-output bandwidth requirements, than some other implementations which include
only the finite field arithmetic operations on the chip. Also this design is well suited for
implementation on reconfigurable platform.
The functional unit, capable of performing the finite field arithmetic operations, is the
most critical unit of the elliptic curve processor. Efficient architectures for the various
arithmetic units have been proposed in this work. These include a digit-serial multiplier
and a bit-parallel squarer. Also, a significant gain in performance is achieved by using
projective coordinates for representation ofpoints on the elliptic curve.
1.2 Motivation
The popularity of the Internet has grown considerably over the past few years. It is very
important to maintain security of transactions over such an open environment. This has
fueled research into various cryptographic protocols. Also since the Internet provides a
diverse environment ofheterogeneous systems, it is impossible to find one algorithm that
meets the needs of all users. In order to meet these needs, reconfigurable cryptographic
implementations can be used, which enable users to select among different algorithms,
depending on their particular application.
According to NIST (National Institute of Technology and Standards), elliptic curve
cryptosystems (ECC) can be used to provide more security per bit than any other known
public key scheme. They have matched the key lengths of various public-key algorithms
with the strength of resulting cryptosystems, for example, a 163-bit key implementation
of elliptic curve technology offers equivalent security strength ofa 1024-bit RSA system
[LDOO]. Smaller key sizes have the potential to result in faster mathematical
computations (public key schemes involve complex mathematical operations using the
key), lower processing power, memory and bandwidth saving. This makes ECC really
attractive for mobile devices having limited power, CPU (Central Processing Unit) and
bandwidth. Additionally, ECC is not a single algorithm but a family of various public-
key algorithms. Therefore the user can choose from the different algorithms for tradeoff
between speed and security of the cipher.
One way ofproviding faster security mechanisms is to embed the security mechanism in
hardware. Reconfigurable hardware devices or FPGAs provide more flexibility than
traditional ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuits) systems for designing
cryptographic applications. The flexibility arises from the capability of reconfigurable
devices to use different algorithms optimized for specific applications. It could be argued
here that a static algorithm operating in different processing modes can also be used to
meet the need for different algorithms. However, implementing different processing
modes on a single device takes up more resources and increases cost. Reconfiguration
helps reduce system costs through hardware reuse [SHA97] by swapping between
algorithms as required. Also problems with the design can be fixed without altering any
on board resources. Another benefit of reconfigurable hardware is that it can meet the
varying security requirements when the mobile device roams in various trust domains. (A
trust domain is a security domain which is under the control ofa single trusted authority.
All the entities in a particular domain trust this authority. Different trust domains have
different security policies which the mobile device should adapt to.)
FPGAs also provide the ability to develop faster, area efficient and cost effective designs
than software implementations. The instructions in most software languages are executed
sequentially and have a low degree of parallelism [DW99] than hardware
implementations. Also, if instruction level parallelism (ILP) techniques such as
superscalar or VLIW (Very Long Instruction Word) are used (where the ILP compilers
extract the parallel instruction stream from an application and distribute it to different
execution units), even the smartest ILP compiler cannot provide a high degree of
parallelism by keeping all the execution units running at all times [MAR01]. The
processors are not dedicated for a specific purpose, so they are relatively slow and
consume more power [DW99]. Operating systems are also incapable of securely
maintaining the private key as in hardware [DMV01]. This has motivated the study of
elliptic curve cryptosystems on hardware platforms, particularly reconfigurable hardware.
1.3 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 summarizes the past implementations of elliptic curve systems in both
hardware and software platforms. It addresses the issues involved in choosing a particular
platform and compares some of the past research contributions. Chapter 3 provides an
introduction to cryptography, comparison of public key and private key cryptosystems,
and discusses the various cryptographic protocols. In chapter 4, the mathematical
background needed for implementing finite field arithmetic is discussed. With the
knowledge of the mathematics, elliptic curves are introduced in chapter 5 and the elliptic
curve operations needed for the elliptic curve scalar multiplication process are explained.
A description ofthe various elliptic curve cryptographic protocols is also provided in this
chapter. The algorithms used for the implementation of the elliptic curve cryptosystem
are described in chapter 6 along with their benefits and comparisons with other
algorithms. The entire design and implementation cycle is contained in chapter 7. Also
the tools used for implementation and their features are discussed. The architecture ofthe
target FPGAs, and their advantages and disadvantages are described. Chapter 8 describes
the architecture of the elliptic curve processor. The architecture of the various arithmetic
units which perform the finite field arithmetic is also explained, along with its benefits
and performance comparisons. Also described is the concurrency used in the design.
Chapter 9 contains the results and conclusion. It also contains performance analysis with
past implementations. An absolute timing analysis of the system and the individual
functional units, along with recommendations for future research in this area are
provided.
Chapter 2
Past Implementations
There have been a number ofnotable implementations ofelliptic curve cryptosystem on
both hardware and software platforms. The following summarizes some ofthe work in
this area.
2.1 Software Implementations
A fast implementation of key exchange (exchange of a piece of information used for
encryption and decryption) using an elliptic curve was reported in [S0095]. This was
one of the earliest reported implementations of elliptic curve cryptosystem and it
compared elliptic curve with non elliptic curve implementations. The elliptic curve group
was defined over the binary field GF (2155), using polynomial basis representation for the
points on the curve. This software implementation was tested on two platforms, on the
SUN SPARC IPC (25 MHz, 32-bit architecture) and the DEC Alpha 3000(175 MHz, 64-
bit architecture). They used the double-and-add method for multiplication in the finite
field. Squaring was done using a linear time algorithm by interleaving 0s in between the
ls in the input polynomial. A fast and efficient algorithm for computing inverse was also
proposed. The scalar multiplication operation was performed in 124 milliseconds on the
SUN whereas it took only 9.9 milliseconds on the DEC Alpha; because of the 64-bit
architecture of the Alpha the performance was much better. This work also showed the
elliptic curve implementations using GF (2m) were computationally faster than non
elliptic curve versions for the same level of security.
In order to further increase the speed of computations, a software implementation over
GF (2m) using polynomial basis representation was described in [DBV96], where the
calculations were carried out using pre-computed lookup tables. Since the intermediate
values for various operations were already computed and stored, computations did not
have to be done each time, which resulted in higher speeds. The field elements were
represented as polynomials with coefficients in the smaller field GF (216), because
computations in a smaller field are easier and faster, with less number of bits. This
implementation was tested on a Pentium/133 based PC. A field multiplication operation
for GF (2177) took 62.7 microseconds, which was significantly faster than the one
reported in the previous case.
Although, binary and prime fields are the two most popular choices for elliptic curve
implementations [CERTOO], Guajardo and Paar [GP97] investigated an implementation
of ECC on composite fields of the form GF ((2m) n). They proposed three new and
efficient algorithms for elliptic curve arithmetic over composite Galois fields GF ((2m) n).
These included algorithms for point multiplication, inverse and field multiplication
operations. However, a recent attack on ECC over composite fields has made it less
useful in practice [GHSOO]. They have shown that is relatively easier to solve the discrete
logarithm in composite fields.
An implementation of elliptic curve cryptography in C on a Pentium II, 400 MHz
processor using binary fields is reported in [DLA00]. The minimum time taken for the
point multiplication operation was 1 .6milliseconds for GF (2163) using random curves and
1.1 milliseconds using fixed Koblitz curves, which are recommended by NIST (National
Institute of Standards in Technology). They used projective coordinates for the
representation of the points on the curve which resulted in much better performance than
earlier implementations.
Brown et. al. [BDM01] reported a similar implementation over prime fields. Both these
implementations used NIST recommended fields and curves.
There was an increased demand for higher- speed encryption algorithms [PT01] which
were required to run at the transmission rates of the wireless communication links.
Therefore, new methods were proposed to accelerate the finite field arithmetic used in
elliptic curve cryptosystems.
Elliptic curve point multiplication involves multiplying a random integer k with a point
on the curve P, to get another point on the curve (represented as kP = 2(((P + 2(P + 2P)) +
...+P))). This is a series ofpoint additions and point doublings. In [SS01] a new method
8of computing
2k P (point doubling operation) directly without computing intermediate
points 2P, 22P,...2k"1P was introduced which claimed to improve performance by 45%
than other known algorithms for point doubling. An elliptic curve scalar multiplication
using this method took 18.4 milliseconds on a GF (2160) using Pentium II, 400MHz.
Other algorithms for improved arithmetic in finite fields suitable for software platforms
were introduced in [KING01, HAS01, OPOOa, and LD98].
The following table summarizes the past software implementations. (For implementations
on prime field like [BDM01], the elements are integers from 0 to p, represented in binary
format in most cases.)
Implementation Platform Field and Speed (Point
Representation Multiplication)
[S0095] SUN SPARC IPC GF (21") - 124 milliseconds
DEC Alpha 3000 Polynomial
Basis
9.9 milliseconds
[DBV96] Pentium /133 GF (21V/) -
Polynomial
Basis
62.7 microseconds
[GP97] DEC Alpha 3000 GF(2lb)u-
Polynomial
Basis
19.7 milliseconds
[DLAOO] Pentium II, 400 GF (2lbJ) - 1.1 milliseonds
MHz Polynomial
Basis
[BDM01] Pentium II, 400
MHz
GF(192) - bits 681 microseconds
Table 2.1 : Summary ofPast Implementations ofECC in software
It can be seen from the table, that the architecture and speed of the processor in software
implementations, greatly influences the speed of computations. The 64-bit DEC Alpha
provides better performance in [S0095] than the 32-bit SUN machine. In [GP97] the
implementation was tested on 233 MHz and a 175 MHz DEC Alpha. The former
produced much better results than the later. Also it is observed that binary fields with
polynomial basis representation are a popular choice, since computations over this field
are easier as the coefficients of the polynomials are 0 and 1.
Implementations ofECC in software are flexible and portable. They are medium to low
cost solutions developed in a reasonable amount of time. In spite of this, implementations
on general-purpose processors do not provide good physical security, as it is difficult to
securely store keys on most operating systems (O.S)PMVOl]. This has motivated the
research into hardware platforms, which are explored for the implementation ofECC.
2.2 Hardware Implementations
Different hardware platforms were investigated for implementing ECC (custom VLSI,
ASIC, FPGA). These have been widely researched due to the benefits of smaller key
length and less bandwidth requirements. ECC hardware implementations use less number
of transistors, for example a VLSI (Very Large Scale Integration) implementation of 155-
bit ECC reported utilized only 11,000 transistors [AMV93] compared with an equivalent
strength 512-bit RSA processor, which used 50,000 transistors [IWD92].
An efficient ASIC implementation of Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem was reported in
[ST03]. The elliptic curve processor architecture proposed in this work supports both GF
(p) and GF (2n) by using a dual-field multiplier. The processor is also capable ofadapting
to arbitrary fields, curves and operator sizes. This architecture was synthesized on a 0.13
|om CMOS (Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor) standard cell library and the
speeds obtained for 160-bit scalar multiplication were 1.44 milliseconds and 0.19
milliseconds for GF (p) and GF (2n) respectively. The design includes a Montgomery
multiplier with an optimized data bus and an on-the-fly redundant binary conversion
which greatly enhances performance. This implementation is based on advanced
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technology and has superior performance. It is a expensive solution useful for critical
security applications.
Reconfigurable hardware has been widely explored for implementing ECC, where the
cryptosystem can be reconfigured with different parameters and algorithms depending on
the varying security requirements. Some of the notable ones reported include [OPOOa,
SB03, ROS98, OP01, BDG02, NGC03, and LMW00].
Rosner reported [ROS98] an elliptic curve processor (ECP) developed on an FPGA for
composite fields. He reported a speed of 4.47 milliseconds for point multiplication on a
curve defined over GF ((28)21). Again, composite fields are considered to be prone to
attack and its use is being discouraged in ECC implementations.
An FPGA implementation of a Microcoded Elliptic Curve Cryptographic Processor was
reported in [LMW00]. The design was successfully tested on a Xilinx Virtex XCV300-4
for 113 bits; it utilized 1290 slices (An FPGA slice usually consists of two Look-up-
Tables (LUT), two flip flops and some carry and control logic) at a maximum frequency
of 45 MHz. This implementation performed an elliptic curve scalar multiplication in 3.7
milliseconds. In this implementation, both the field and the curve operations were
performed on the chip, and so it did not have high input-output (PO) bandwidth
requirements, as compared to the chips which implement only the field operations.
Projective coordinates to represent the points of the curves were used in this work. Using
projective coordinates eliminates the need for inversion (which is the most costly finite
field operation), in the point addition and point doubling operations.
A comparison between different elliptic curve point multiplications using various hybrid
coordinate representations and multiplication algorithms is given in [BDG02]. The study
suggests that polynomial basis is the best choice for representation of field elements. Also
Montgomery algorithm for multiplication using Jacobian or projective coordinates gives
the best performance.
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The work proposed in [OPOOa] describes an efficient and scalable elliptic curve processor
architecture for reconfigurable hardware. This design uses two programmable processors,
a bit-parallel squarer, digit serial multiplier and polynomial basis representation of
elements in the finite field GF (2n). The prototypes were implemented on the Xilinx
XCV400E-8-BG432 (Virtex E) FPGA and the speed reported for computing an elliptic
curve scalar multiplication in this case was 0.21 milliseconds for the field GF (2167). This
is the fastest reported implementation of ECC on reconfigurable platform. The same
group proposed a scalable architecture for an elliptic curve processor for the curve
defined over prime field GF (p) in [OP01]. A special Montgomery multiplier algorithm
was implemented, which used precomputed values and therefore this architecture is
suitable only for memory-rich hardware. A single point multiplication in this case took
approximately 3 milliseconds for an arbitrary point on a curve defined over GF
(2192
-
264
- 1), which was slower than the binary field implementation.
The following table summarizes the implementations ofECC on reconfigurable platform.
Implementation FPGA Used Field and
Representation
Speed (Point
Multiplication)
[ST03] ASIC -0.13nm
CMOS
GF(192)
GF(2160) -
Polynomial Basis
1.44 milliseconds
0.19 milliseconds
[ROS98] XC4062XLPG475-
1
GF ((2s)71) -
Polynomial Basis
4.47 milliseconds
[LMW00] Xilinx Virtex
XCV300-4
GF(2UJ)
OptimalNormal
Basis
3.7 milliseconds
[OP00] XCV400E-8-BG432 GF (216/)
Polynomial Basis
0.21 milliseconds
[OP01] XCV1000E-8-
BG680
(2lw-2b4-l)
Bits
3 milliseconds
Table 2.2: Summary ofPast Implementations ofECC on FPGA
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The speed of a particular implementation depends on various factors such as the
parameter selection, selection of algorithms, selection of underlying field and of the
elliptic curve [CERTOO]. The speed ofECC on reconfigurable hardware also depends on
the architecture ofthe target FPGA [DMV01]. Both [LMWOO] and [OP00] use projective
coordinates for the computation process which has shown to improve performance. Also,
fixed elliptic curves have proven to be more efficient in these implementations.
An implementation of a scalable and efficient elliptic curve processor, capable of
performing the scalar multiplication operation is reported in this work. The
implementation differs from most previous ones by using random elliptic curves defined
over binary fields GF (2n) with polynomial basis representation of elements. Support for
arbitrary fields, parameters is also provided in the processor. Fast and efficient algorithms
for scalar multiplication and finite field arithmetic are used and prototyped on an FPGA.
13
Chapter 3
Cryptography
3.1 Introduction
Cryptography is defined as the science ofmathematics used to encrypt and decrypt data.
Cryptanalysis is the study of how to compromise cryptographic measures, which also
aids in designing good ciphers, and cryptology is the combination of cryptography and
cryptanalysis. Encryption ofdata is to transform it into an unintelligible form that can be
transmitted or stored securely over insecure systems such as the Internet. Decryption of
data is transforming the encrypted data back to readable form.
Plaintext
Plaintext
Ciphertext
^
i
Encryption
Algorithm
Decryption
Algorithm
^ w
aider Re
Man - in - middle
Fig 3.1: Language ofCryptography (The basic cryptographic process)
The figure above illustrates the basis of a cryptographic process. Plaintext is the data that
needs to be encrypted. This is done by using some scheme or algorithm that is known as
the cipher. The resulting data after application of the cipher is the ciphertext. The cipher-
text should be such that any adversary in the communication channel should not be able
to decrypt the data back to its original form. Only the person for who the message is
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intended can decrypt it using a key. A key is a short piece of information which is used
along with a cipher for encryption and decryption, only by an authorized user. An
algorithm (cipher) and key together form a cryptosystem.
However, cryptography is not just encryption and decryption. It also provides other
services such as authentication, integrity and non-repudiation. Authentication allows the
recipient to confirm the identity of the sender. Integrity of the message assures the
recipient that it was not modified in transit. It should be noted here that the recipient is
only able to detect message modification, not prevent it. Non-repudiation prevents the
sender from claiming at a later date that they never sent the message.
There are basically 2 types ofcryptosystems that provide the above mentioned services.
1 . Public-key or Asymmetric cryptosystem
2. Private-key or Symmetric cryptosystem
3.2 Private-key Cryptosystem
In this type ofcryptosystem the key used to encrypt and decrypt is the same, known as
the symmetric key.
Key
Plaintext ^ r
Ciphertext
k
i r
Plaintext
_?
Encryption Decryption
w
Algjorithm
^ w
Algo rithm
Sender Receiver
Fig 3.2: Symmetric Cryptosystem - same key is used for encryption and decryption
Symmetric key systems can be used to provide authentication along with encryption. The
main problem with this type of cryptosystem is that the different parties involved in the
15
communication have to agree upon a secret key and keep it secret. There has to be an
exchange of key information for the first time. In order to transmit the key it has to be
encrypted which requires another key.
The most common techniques used in symmetric key cryptography are block ciphers,
stream ciphers and message authentication codes (MACs). Block cipher is an algorithm
that encrypts data in discrete units called blocks rather than a continuous stream. A block
of plaintext is converted into a block of ciphertext using a user-defined key. The
ciphertext is decrypted into plaintext using the same key. A stream cipher encrypts data
serially; it works on smaller units of the plaintext. A message authentication code is an
authentication tag derived by applying an authentication scheme, together with a secret
key to a message. Since MACs are computed and verified using the same key, they can
only be verified by the intended recipient.
3.3 Public-Key Cryptosystem
In this type ofcryptosystem the key used to encrypt and decrypt is different and hence it
is known as asymmetric cryptosystem.
KE
Sender
KD
Plaintext i r
Ciphertext
^
i r
Plaintext
Encryption Decryption
w
Alg;orithm
^ w
Algo rithm
Receiver
Fig 3.3: Asymmetric Cryptosystem - different key is used for encryption and
decryption.
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Public-key cryptography was introduced by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman [DH76]
to address the key management issue in traditional secret key cryptography. Each person
in the communication channel has 2 types ofkeys - a public key, which is published, and
a secret key, which is kept secret. So when A wants to send a message to B, she uses B's
public key to encrypt it, and B can decrypt the message using her private key. The two
users can communicate securely without the need for exchanging keys. Public key
cryptosystems can also be used to provide authentication. IfA encrypts a message using
his private key then B can decrypt the message using only A's public key, which means
that the message was created byA alone.
The public key is used to generate a transformation and the private key is used to
generate another transformation. Both transformations are formed ofa one-way function
and are inversely related to each other. So the public key of a particular user can be used
to decrypt a message encrypted by his private key and vice versa. A public key cannot
decrypt a message encrypted by another public key.
The main uses ofpublic key cryptography are encryption and authentication using digital
signatures.
Advantages and disadvantages of public and private key cryptography
The main advantage of public key cryptosystems is that they do not require any secret
key exchange between the users. Secret key cryptography requires the secret key to be
transmitted from the sender to the receiver, either manually or through some
communication channel. This compromises the secrecy ofthe secret key and it is possible
for someone to know the secret key en route.
Public key cryptosystems also provide techniques for digital signatures which provide the
authentication and non-repudiation service. Authentication by secret key involves sharing
a secret, sometimes with a third party as well, so a sender can repudiate a previously sent
message by claiming that the shared secret was somehow compromised by the third party
[RSAOO].
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The primary advantage of secret key cryptography is that it can provide more efficient
and faster encryption than public-key. Public-key algorithms involve complex
mathematics and are relatively slower [WAL91].
Also in public key cryptosystems, the message can be sent only to a single user, since it is
encrypted using his/her public key. In secret key cryptography, a message encrypted with
a secret key can be published and so all the users having the secret key can decrypt it.
Another problem in public key cryptography is that a user may impersonate another user
since the public keys are published.
In order to achieve advantages from both schemes, public key cryptography should be
used for key exchange and authentication and private key for encryption [ROS99]. This is
because private key encryption is faster and asymmetric cryptosystems can be used for
securely exchanging keys, without the need to share any secret information.
3.4 Digital Signatures
A digital signature of a message is a piece ofdata dependent on some secret known only
to the sender (signer), and additionally, on the content of the message being signed
[MOV96]. Digital signatures provide authentication, integrity and non-repudiation
services. The process of digital signature generation and verification is depicted in the
figures below.
18
Message to be signed
EncryptedMessage
Hash Function
Message Digest
Public Key
Private Key
Asymmetric
Encryption
Digital
Signature
Fig 3.4: Generation of a Digital Signature
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Fig 3.5: Verification of a Digital Signature by the receiver, by comparing the
message digest with the decrypted signature
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The message, which is to be signed, is encrypted using the recipient's public key. A hash
function is applied to this encrypted message to generate a message digest. The hash
function has two properties - one that it is a one-way function and secondly it produces a
unique message digest for every message it is applied to. Message digest is typically
smaller in length than the original message, because the hash function compresses the
message from an arbitrary length to a smaller fixed length [RSAOO]. A transformation
(encryption algorithm) is applied to the message digest using the senders private key
(meaning that the sender has now signed the message, since his private key is unique) and
a digital signature is generated. The encrypted message and the digital signature are both
transmitted to the receiver.
The receiver first decrypts the message using his private key. He then applies the same
one-way hashing function to this message to generate the message digest. (Information
about which hashing function used is also transmitted by the sender.) The recipient then
decrypts the digital signature to get the message digest. If the two message digests
generated match, it means that the message has not been modified (integrity), the sender
is identified (authentication) and it cannot to be repudiated in the future since the message
digest was encrypted using the sender's private key.
3.5 Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP)
The discrete logarithm problem applies on certain algebraic structures called groups. A
group is a finite or infinite set of elements (finite in cryptographic applications), along
with a binary or group operation, which satisfies certain mathematical properties.
DLP forms the basis ofmost public key cryptosystems because it is a hard mathematical
problem to compute. The running time for the algorithms used to compute the discrete
logarithm is approximately 0(Jg) (square root of the order of group g) [ODL99]. The
order of a group is the number of elements in the group, which is about
2m (m is in the
range of 160 -560) for cryptographic applications. Ifm = 160, the assumption is that the
DLP cannot be solved any faster than V2A160 , which is about
IO24
group operations.
This would require about 1026 computer instructions. A MIPS (Millions of Instructions
20
per Second)-year (MY) is about 3 x
IO13 instructions, so to solve the discrete logarithm it
would require
IO12 MY [ODL99].
Mathematically, DLP is represented as follows
Consider an element a in group G. Now if a is multiplied n times to itself it gives
another element b in G.
ax ax a xa (n times) modp = b = anmodp.
The discrete logarithm problem is to find the inverse n given a,b and p .
Example
For a = 6, n = 9, p= 11,
b = an mod p = a (a2)2) 2 mod p
with fourmultiplications:
b = 6 (62)2) 2 mod 1 1 = 6 (36)2)2 mod 1 1
= 6 (3)2)2 mod 1 1 - 6(9)2 mod 1 1
= 6(81)modll=6(4)modll
= 24modll=2
However finding an n such that 2 = 6nmod 1 1 is difficult.
Various researchers have investigated the discrete logarithm problem [COP84, ODL84]
and it has been reported to have expected running times similar to those of the best
factoring algorithms. Rivest [RIV92a] has analyzed the expected time to solve the
discrete logarithm problem both in terms of computing power and cost. The best known
schemes for solving the discrete logarithm problem are the index-calculus methods and
collision search methods [RSA00]. Index calculus is a sub-exponential time algorithm
whereas collision search takes fully exponential time to solve the DLP.
3.6 KeyManagement
Key management involves secure generation, distribution and storage of keys.
Exchanging secret key securely is the main problem of secret key cryptosystems
[RSAOO]. Various methods have been devised for the distribution of secret keys. There
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are 2 automated methods for key distribution, which are discussed, in the American
National Standards Institute (ANSI) standard X9.17, namely the "Financial Institution
KeyManagement" and the "Diffie/Hellman key exchange".
3.6.1 Diffie Hellman (DH) Key Exchange
The steps involved in Diffie Hellman key exchange protocol are as follows.
Assume Alice and Bob are the two people in the communication and they want to
generate a secret key.
Both select a prime number pand a primitive root gmodp . Both these parameters are
made public. The root g is such that for any number n from 1 and p-1, there exists an
integer k such that n = g modp
1 . Alice selects a random value a from between 1 and p - 1
2. Alice computes g
a
modp and sends it to Bob
3. Bob selects a random value b from between 1 and p - 1
4. Bob computes and sends g modp to Alice
5. Alice then computes (g modp)a = g modp
6. Bob computes (g amodp) = g modp , which is the shared secret key.
The strength of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol lies in the fact that giveng,p,
(ga
modp ) and (g modp ) it is computationally infeasible to find g modp
[RSAOO]. The DH key exchange is based on the DLP and has similar running times as
the DLP [MAU94].
3.7 Certificates
In public key cryptography, users use certificates in order to obtain each other's public
key securely. A certificate is document, which cannot be forged, containing information
about the user's public key. The certificate can be obtained from a central issuance
agency called Certifying Authority (CA) [RSAOO]. CA is a centralized administration
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such as a companywhich issues certificates to its employees, or a university which issues
certificates to its faculty, students and staff. It maintains a public key ring server which
stores the public keys securely. The CA either gets its certificate from another higher
authority or may make its public key, public.
A certificate contains the digital signature of the CA, the CA's public key and the user's
public key. Certificates also contain other information such as the time for which it is
valid. Certificate formats are discussed in [KEN93].
Certificates prevent impersonation. A sender encrypts the message using the recipient's
public key and sends it to him/her. The recipient uses the CA's public key to decode the
digital certificate attached to the message, verifies it as issued by the CA and then obtains
the sender's public key and identification information held within the certificate. With
this information, the recipient can now send an encrypted reply. If messages are
exchanged between a pair of users quite often, the more they trust each other, and
certificates need not be enclosed and verified every time [RSAOO]. If two people send
messages to each other every day, they only need to enclose certificates the first time.
After some exchanges the users store each other's public key and certificates are no
longer required.
23
Chapter 4
Mathematical Background
Introduction
Koblitz [KOB87] and Miller [MIL86] independently proposed elliptic curves defined
over a finite group of elements known as a finite field, for cryptographic applications.
The security of the ECC is based on the intractability of the DLP over finite groups of
numbers or finite fields. The DLP over group ofpoints ofan elliptic curve defined over a
finite field (Elliptic Curve DLP) is significantly more difficult than the DLP over
ordinary finite groups of numbers [CLHOO]. This is because in ordinary groups of
numbers solving the DLP is simply computing the inverse of modular exponentiation
[Sec. 3.5]. For additional security in these groups, large exponentiations have to be
computed, which is a very expensive operation in terms of resources required. The
structure of elliptic curve groups provides more flexibility in selecting the parameters of
the cryptosystem which simplifies computations and can lead to efficient
implementations [LM95].
There are finite number of points on an elliptic curve defined in the X-Y plane, along
with a special point at infinity O, which is also called as the origin point or the additive
identity. The elliptic curve points can be counted and an addition operation can be
defined on them, such that adding any two points results in a third point on the curve.
These points, along with the addition operation form what is known as the elliptic curve
group. The selection of points, for elliptic curve cryptographic implementations is done
from a group of numbers, which form a finite field, and so elliptic curve groups are said
to be defined over finite fields. Finite fields and groups obey certain mathematical
properties which are discussed later on in this chapter.
This chapter begins with an introduction to some mathematical structures, which are
necessary in order to understand well groups and fields, the two most important concepts
required in order to implement an ECC. More information on finite fields and groups is
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found in [LHC01, MH93]. The points on the elliptic curve can be represented in certain
formats such as a polynomial basis or optimal normal basis representations. These
representations are discussed in this chapter. Also included are the finite field arithmetic
operations required in the elliptic curve scalar multiplication process, which forms the
heart ofthe ECC.
4.1 Some basic structures ofAlgebra
Algebra is the branch ofmathematics that defines the basic arithmetic relationships using
variables. It studies the properties of operations on algebraic structures. Structures of
algebra form a collection of objects and operations which can be used to calculate and
solve equations. These objects can be numbers, polynomials or geometrical figures.
4.1.1 Identity Element
Every elliptic curve group contains an identity element with respect to the operation
defined on that group.
An element e ofa set X is called an identity element of X relative to any operation, say
*, (notation for the operation defined on set, such as addition ormultiplication) on X if
e*x = x*e-x
for all x e X
Example: The number 1 is the identity element for the set of integers, under the
multiplication operation as any number multiplied by 1 gives the same number.
4.1.2 Groups
The points on an elliptic curve form an elliptic curve group with the addition operation.
If * is an associative operation on set X, then {X ;*} (set X with the operation *) is
known as a semigroup.
Example
Let a, b, c C X and let
'*' be an operation on X.
Ifa * (b * c) = (a
* b) * c; then {X ;*} is a semigroup.
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IfX contains an identity element relative to * then {X ;*} is called a monoid.
Example
Let X be a semigroup and let a be an element inZ. If a*e = e*a = a; then e is an
identity element and X is a monoid with operation *.
A group is a monoid in which every element is invertible; i.e., a group is a semigroup {X
;*}, with identity in which every element is invertible or has an inverse in the same
group.
Properties of a group
Let {X ;*} be a group and let e be the identity element ofX relative to *.
Let a and b be elements of X . Then the group X is said to have the following
properties.
1. Closure - a * b = c G X. For every operation on elements in X, the resulting
element in also inX.
2. Associative - The group operation * is associative; i.e., a * (b * c) = (a * b) * c
for c in X.
3. Identity - e * b = b * e = b. (e is the identity element)
4. Inverse - For every element in X, there exists an inverse in X. a,
a"1C X.
Also a * a"1
~
a"1 * a = e.
Example: The set of real numbers with the addition operation form a group, since it
satisfies all the properties ofa group.
Closure - Addition ofany two real numbers, results in a real number
Associative - Addition is an associative operation;
(2.3 + 4.0 ) + 6.57 = 2.3 + (4.0 + 6.57)
Identity - Zero is the identity elements in the set of real numbers. Adding any
number with 0 is the same number.
Inverse - The inverse ofany number in the set of real numbers is the negative of
that number. 4.67 + (-4.67) = 0 (identity element).
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IfX has a finite number ofelements then X is known as a finite group.
The following two definitions (abelian group and rings) lead into the definition ofa field,
over which the elliptic curve cryptosystem is defined.
Abelian group
A group {X ;*} is said to be an abelian group if the operation * is commutative; i.e.,
a * b - b *a
The points on an elliptic curve form an abelian group with the addition operation
[SAE96], as addition is a commutative operation.
4.1.3 Rings
Let X be a non-empty set, and let + and * be two operations on X. Then {X; +, *} is
said to be ring if
1 . {X ;+} is an abelian group.
2. {X;*} is a semigroup; and
3. The operation * is distributive over +. For example - (a + b) * c = (a * c) + (b
*
c) and c
* (a + b) = (c * a) + (c * b).
If in the ring {X; +, *}, the operation * is commutative then it is known as a
commutative ring.
4.1.4 Finite Field
A field {X; +, *} is a ring in which the * operation is commutative and all non-zero
elements have multiplicative inverses, i.e., for every a 0, a C X there exists an element
a"1C X such that
a *
a"1
~
a"1 * a = 1 .
If the number of elements in the field is finite, it is called finite field. Elliptic curve
groups are defined over finite fields. ECC rely on the difficulty ofcomputing the discrete
logarithm over finite fields.
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4.1.5 Some other definitions
Order of a Point
The order of an element a e X , is the smallest positive integer t such that a' = e
(identity element). The elliptic curve scalar multiplication involves computing kP , where
P is a point on the curve and A; is a random integer, resulting in another point on the
curve (Q=kP). If the order of the point P is a prime number of n bits, then
computing, knowing kP and P takes roughly 2n/2 operations. If point P is 160 bits
long, then to find k , the number of operations needed is about 280. If someone does a
billion operations per second, this takes about 38 million years [ENG04].
Order of the Curve
The order of the curve is the total number ofpoints on the curve. Knowledge ofthe order
of the curve is helpful in determining the security level of the cryptosystem [ROS99]. If
the order contains a large prime factor, then it is considered to be more secure against
certain attacks like the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm [ENG99]. However, finding this
number for random curves is difficult and for most applications it is acceptable to not
know the order of the curve [ROS99]. If the group order is large enough then most
attacks do not work [ENG99]. However, for advanced nuclear-grade crypto it is essential
to know the number ofpoints on the curve.
It is suffice for most applications, that the number of points satisfy Hasse's theorem
which states that -
Given a fieldFp , the order of the curve N will satisfy the equation
\N-(p+\)\ .
If n is 2140, there is a reasonable probability that the order of the curve will contain a
prime factor of the order of
2112
or greater [ROS99]. For maximum security, curves
having order with prime factors close to the size of the field i.e.,
2n"2
are chosen, where
thesizeoffieldGF(2n)is2n.
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Characteristic of a field
The characteristic ofa field is the smallest possible integer p such that adding 1 to itselfp
times yields 0. For a field represented as GF (p"), p is the characteristic ofthe field. When
n = 1, the resulting field is known as prime field and the points on the elliptic curve are
selected from between 0 and p-1. Fields with characteristic 2, GF (2n) are also
standardized for implementing ECC as an alternative to prime fields.
Generator of a field
Finite fields overwhich elliptic curves are defined are a cyclic group ofnumbers. All the
elements in the group can be generated from a single element called generator of the
group or the primitive element. An element g is said to be a generator in X if every
element in X can be expressed as g' for some integer t.
4.2 Finite Field Options
Finite fields are also known as Galois field, represented as GF (q), where q is the number
of elements in the finite field. Finite fields exist only for q = pm, where p is a prime
number and m is a positive integer. The figure below shows the different types of finite
fields over which ECC can be defined.
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Fig 4.1: Finite Field Options [PAR99]
In cryptographic applications, two kinds of fields are commonly used [IEEE99], because
these fields are extremely well studied and a number of algorithms [IEEE99] have been
proposed for efficient arithmetic in these fields. Also both these fields are included in the
standard draft for public key cryptography (IEEE PI 363) for implementing an ECC.
1 . Prime fields GF (p) where p is large prime number.
2. Binary fields GF (2m) where m is large integer and is mostly a prime number.
The following provides an explanation of prime fields and binary fields. Section 4.5
discusses the factors, which influenced the selection of binary field over prime field for
this particular implementation.
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4.2.1 Prime Field
A prime field GF (p) consists ofa finite group of numbers between 0 and p - 1 with the
addition and multiplication operation. All operations in GF (p) are performed modulo
prime p, resulting in an element in the same field. All the elements of the prime field
can be generated from a single element g in GF (p) such that g'mod p GF (p). (gis
known as the generator of the field GF (p)), where 0 <i< p- 1 .
4.2.2 Binary Field
A binary field is represented as GF (2m) and consists of 2m elements. For any prime
power there exists only one finite field, so for a particular m two representations ofGF
(2m) are isomorphic [WM03]. The most common forms of representing elements of the
binary field are polynomial basis and optimal normal basis.
4.3 Polynomial Basis
A polynomial f (x) over a field GF (p) is represented as follows:
f(x) = an+a,x+ax +. -Hi .x +a
xn
J v ' 0 1 2 n-l n
where a,a.# a are known as coefficients of the polynomial and x is the variable
0 12 n
which is a complex number.
The polynomial f (x) can be represented in vector form as { a^jx^fx^ &n }
Example - 4x4 + 5x3 + x + 1 is a polynomial, represented in vector form as {4, 5, 0, 1, 1}
All operations are performed on the coefficients of the polynomials.
A field element in polynomial basis can be generated in GF (2m) with coefficients in GF
(2) (i.e., 0 and 1) with an irreducible polynomial (A polynomial is said to be irreducible
in GF (q) if it cannot be factored into a product of lower degree polynomials in GF (q)) of
degree m.
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Operations in Polynomial Basis
In the elliptic curve scalar multiplication process, four arithmetic operations in any field
are required. These include field addition, field multiplication, field squaring and field
inversion.
Addition and subtraction of two polynomials in GF (2m) is the exclusive-OR (XOR)
operation; because addition and subtraction modulo 2 is XOR.
1 + 1 mod 2 = 0
0 + 1 mod 2 = 1
0 + 0 mod 2 = 0
{ao, ai, a2... an-i, an} + {b0, bi, t>2... bn-i, bn} = {c0, ci, c2... Cn_i, cn}.
where C; = &i xor bi
Example
(x4 + x3 + x+l) +
(x4 + x2 + x+l)
Coefficients ofequal powers ofx in the two polynomials are XOR ed with each other.
Therefore,
x4 1 + 1=0
x3 1+0 = 1
x2 0 + 1 = 1
x 1+1=0
x 1 + 1=0
which is x3 + x2
Multiplication in polynomial basis is simply shift left and XOR (add).
For example
(x4 + x)*(^ + x+l)
= x4 *
(x2 + x + 1) + x * (x2 + x + 1)
=
x6 +
x5 +
x4 + x3 + x2 + X
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The exponents get added in the multiplication process. The highest exponent keeps
increasing, so the multiplication has to be done modulo an irreducible polynomial.
Similarly inversion can be computed in polynomial basis using various known algorithms
such as Fermat's Little Theorem (6.4.1) and the Extended Euclidean Algorithm [ROS99].
4.4 OptimalNormal Basis (ONB)
Unlike polynomial basis, optimal normal basis representation is not very common in
ECC implementations, because the representation is somewhat complex because it
involves double exponentiation. However it has been used for efficient implementations
of cryptosystems, especially in hardware [LMWOO], since exponentiation in ONB is
simply the left rotation of the coefficients. This considerably speeds up the inversion
operation, which involves exponentiation, and leads to efficient hardware
implementations.
As seen in 4.3 an element in polynomial basis is represented as
2 n-l
a = an+a1x+ar,x +. +a ,x
0 l 2 n-l
A normal basis can be formed by using the set
{<r ay ,ay,a}
Any element in field GF (2m) can be represented in normal basis as
jm-\ rfl 9
b = b .o +. +b~a +b,a +brta
m-l 2 10
m-\ /
or b = X b.aZ
i=0
where b; in GF (2).
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When two elements in normal basis are multiplied the result obtained is known as the
lambda matrix [MOV89]. An "optimal" normal basis (ONB) has the minimum number of
non-zero terms in the lambda matrix. This value was found out to be 2m - 1 [ABV89].
There are two types of optimal normal basis [MOV89, ROS99]. The value of m in the
field GF (2m) determines ifan ONB exists for that field and the type ofONB.
1. Type I ONB
For a Type I ONB m + 1 must be prime and 2 must be primitive in the set of
integers 0 to m + 1, which means that 2 raised to any power in the range 0 . . . m-1
modulo m + 1 must result in a unique integer in the range 1 . . .m.
2. Type n ONB
To form a Type n ONB, (2m + 1) should be prime and either 2 is primitive in the
set of integers 2m + 1 or 2m + 1 = 3 mod 4. (= means congruent).
Addition and subtraction in ONB is similar to that defined in polynomial basis.
Multiplication is complex and involves a series of steps [ROS99].
Exponentiation in ONB is very efficient since it can be performed as a simple rotate; so
squaring and inversion (most inversion algorithms involve exponentiation operations) are
easier using the ONB representation.
This thesis focuses on polynomial basis, so the details of ONB arithmetic are not
discussed in detail. The reasons for the selection ofpolynomial basis over ONB for this
particular implementation are explained in the following section.
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4.5 Implementation Options
The selection of the following greatly influences the implementation and the strength of
the resulting cryptosystem [CERT98].
1. Selection of the underlying finite field.
2. Selection ofthe representation of the elements in the finite field
3. Selection of the elliptic curve.
Selection of finite field
Prime fields are very popular in cryptographic systems. Arithmetic operations such as
addition and subtraction are very easy and can be performed with limited resources.
However, inversion in prime fields is slow, and so is multiplication. There are not many
efficient multiplication algorithms proposed for implementation in prime fields as there
are for binary fields. Using GF (p) generally requires a coprocessor for performing the
modular operation, which increases performance but the addition of a coprocessor
increases costs by 20 - 30 % [CERT98]. Another major disadvantage of using prime
fields for cryptosystems is that multiplication needs to be performed with long numbers
(160-2048 bits) on processors (8 - 64 bits) with short word length [PAR99]. However, as
far as the strength of the cryptosystem is concerned there have been no discoveries to
date, which suggest that using prime fields over binary fields for elliptic curve
cryptosystems makes it any easier or harder for attack [CERT00]. The selection of a
particular finite field depends solely on the implementation platform and choice.
Binary fields are well researched and a number of algorithms [DLA00, GP97] have been
proposed for arithmetic in binary fields. The major factor for the choice ofbinary fields is
that the coefficients are 0 and 1, which makes it relatively easy for coding. Also it is very
well suited for hardware implementations. [CERT00] also mentions that a hardware
implementation using binary fields offer significant performance and die size advantages
over prime field implementations, since a coprocessor optimized for GF (2m) arithmetic
would take up less space and offer increased performance levels than the available
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crypto-coprocessors for prime field arithmetic. This is because arithmetic in prime fields
involves computation with very large numbers which requires more hardware resources.
Selection of representation of field elements
When using binary fields, the field elements are commonly represented in polynomial
basis and optimal normal basis as discussed previously. Similar to finite field selection,
the representation of elements does not make the cryptosystem any more susceptible to
attack. Also one type of representation can be easily converted into the other type of
representation. Polynomial basis representation is mathematically less complex than
ONB as seen from section 4.3 and 4.4. Representation in ONB requires two
exponentiations. However some hardware implementation have shown that using ONB
is more efficient since operations are computed by exclusive-OR, shift and rotate which
are fast and less resource consuming [LL02]. Polynomial basis have been proven to be
faster in some software implementations [Sec. 2.1].
[DAH97] showed that a combination ofboth polynomial basis and optimal normal basis
can be used to achieve maximum efficiency by exploiting advantages ofboth.
Selection ofElliptic Curves
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recommend a set of elliptic
curves for implementation. Non-super-singular curves of the form
y2 + xy = x +ax + b
are recommended because a recent attack on super-singular curve (b = 0) has made them
less useful in practice [LM95]. Special kinds of curves called Koblitz curves [KOB92]
have been proposed which have shown to result in faster elliptic curve arithmetic
implementations.
There are advantages in using standard elliptic curves because they provide efficient
implementation, and offer less bandwidth and storage requirements. However standard
elliptic curves are being well studied by cryptanalyst and are becoming less secure
[HIT02]. Generating a random elliptic curve is time consuming [ROS99], but leads to
more secure implementations. In order to increase the immunity of a fixed curve, i.e., in
order to make in more secure, the order of the curve needs to be increased (i.e., the
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number of points on the curve should be increased). So as there are more points this
which means more resources are needed to implement it in hardware.
The implementation reported in this thesis uses binary field with polynomial basis
representation and random elliptic curves. Arithmetic in binary fields is less complex and
lends itself easily to coding because the coefficients are 0 and 1. Polynomial basis
representation is common and is easier to implement than ONB. Also polynomial basis
exists for every prime power whereas ONB exists only for certain primes. Random
elliptic curves offer more security if they are properly chosen, as these are not
documented and well-studied by cryptanalysts. Also most attacks are not possible on
random curves [HIT02]. Some researchers suggest that for extremely critical operations
standard elliptic curves should be used as they are proven to offer good security levels
and generating random curves may compromise the security of the system [ROS99]. It is
very important to ensure that the order of the curve be large and divisible by a large
prime when selecting an elliptic curve, so that the ECC becomes immune to most known
attacks.
37
Chapter 5
Introduction to Elliptic Curves
An elliptic curve over a group ofnumbers is a set of solutions of the equation
7 3
y +sxy-Hy = x +ax + b (5.1)
together with a point at infinity O. This equation is known as the "Weierstrass" equation
[ROS99].
s,t,a,b,x,y belong to the group over which the elliptic curve is defined. This maybe the
set of real numbers or a finite field for cryptographic applications. The point at infinity O
is also the identity point of the elliptic curve. The points on an elliptic curve form an
abelian group with the point addition operation [Sec. 4.1.2].
Elliptic curves for cryptographic applications are defined over finite fields, meaning the
points on the elliptic curve belong to a finite field. Elliptic curves can be geometrically
represented over a group ofreal numbers and so they are discussed first to provide a good
understanding followed by a discussion on elliptic curve groups over finite fields. Point
addition and point doubling are discussed in each case because these are the two
computations required in the scalar multiplication process.
5.1 Elliptic Curves overReal Numbers
1 3
A simpler form of the elliptic curve equation is
y^
= x
D
+ax + b , by taking s and t = 0.
By choosing different values ofa and b from the group ofreal numbers, the elliptic curve
can be plotted in the x-y plane. An important criterion for elliptic curves over real number
is that
x3 + ax + b should not have any repeated factors or equivalently
4a3 + 27b2 f- 0
[CERT00].
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Example
y2
= x3-8x + 5
-? x
Fig 5.1: Elliptic Curve over real numbers
Addition of 2 points on the elliptic curve over real numbers is represented graphically as
follows (Fig 5.2). P and Q are the two points to be added. To do this geometrically, a line
is drawn joining points P and Q, intersecting the curve at exactly one more point -R. A
perpendicular to the x-axis is drawn from this point to intersect the curve at another point
R. The point R is the result ofadding points P and Q.
y2
= x3-8x + 5
P (-2.93, -1.85)
Q (0.154, 1.95)
-R (4.29, 7.03)
R (4.29, -7.03)
? x
Fig 5.2: Point Addition
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y2
= x3-8x + 5
-P (4.29, 7.03)
P (4.29, -7.03)
Fig 5.3: Adding points P and -P is the point at infinity O.
If the two points to be added are negative ofeach other, then the line passing between the
two points intersects the curve at O, which is the point at infinity on the curve. It is the
identity element (Sec. 4.1.1) of curve for the addition operation since the points on the
elliptic curve form an abelian group (Sec. 4.1.2) with the addition operation. This also
proves that point O lies on the curve.
Point Doubling
The geometrical method for doubling a point on the curve consists of drawing a tangent
at the point (P), which intersects the curve at another point (-R). A perpendicular drawn
at this point intersects the curve at another point, which is 2P. This is represented as
shown in the figure below.
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y2
= x3-8x + 5
?
P (0.308, 1.61)
-R (5.19, -10.2)
R (5.19, 10.2)
A P
R
1
-R
V
Fig 5.4: Point Doubling
y2
= x3-8x + 5
Fig 5.5: Doubling a point on the X-axis gives the point at infinity O.
Now, ifthe point to be doubled lies on the X-axis then a tangent drawn at that point
intersects the curve at O, the point at infinity.
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Mathematical Formulae for Point Addition
Mathematically, addition can be represented as follows:
Let there be two points on the curve P(Xp, yp) and Q(Xq, y,). Points P and Q should not be
negative ofeach other.
If s is the slope of the line between P and Q, then s = (yq - yp) / (x, - xp)
LetR(xr,yr) = P +Q;P^-Q
Then
Xj S Xp Xq
yr = - yp + s (xp - xr)
Doubling the point P on the curve is mathematically expressed as follows -
When yp is not 0,
LetR(xr,yr) = 2P.
s =
(3xp2 + a)/(2yp)
X_r ~~* S - " Z.2\r)
yr = - yP + s (xp - Xr).
5.2 Elliptic Curves over Finite Fields
Arithmetic over real numbers can lead to rounding errors. Elliptic curves defined over
finite field are considered a good approach for implementing cryptosystems [SIM92], as
arithmetic over finite fields is efficient and well suited for cryptographic applications
[YOR92]. Most commonly used fields for cryptographic applications are prime fields and
binary fields [IEEE99].
5.2.1 Elliptic Curves over Prime Fields
Elliptic curve groups are defined over prime fields GF (p) where p is a large prime. The
elliptic curve equation remains the same as in real numbers i.e.,
0 3
y modp-x +ax + bmodp
where a, b are chosen from the prime field GF (p). The selection should be such that the
right hand side of the equation should have no repeated roots (4a + 27b f- 0). Then the
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set of solutions to the above equation form an elliptic curve over the prime field GF (p).
There are finitelymany points on such an elliptic curve.
The number ofpoints on an elliptic curve must satisfy Hasse's theorem which states that
- Given a field, Fp, the order of the curveN will satisfy the equation
|N-(p + l)|| <
Example
Consider the prime field with GF (1 1); p = 1 1 and let the elliptic curve equation be
y2
=
x3 + x + 6; where a = 1 and b = 6.
There are 12 points lying on this elliptic curve which satisfy the elliptic curve equation.
(2, 4) , (2, 7) , (3, 5) , (3, 6) , (5,2) , (5, 9) , (7, 2) , (7, 9) , (8, 3), (8,8), (10,2) , (10,9)
which means there are 13 points altogether on the elliptic curve along with the point at
infinity O.
Since there are a finite number ofpoints, this does not represent a curve which can be
plotted in any definite shape; but an important point to note is that there are two points
for every value ofx. So even if the plot is random there is symmetry about the X-axis.
Mathematically the equation for point addition and point doubling remain the same; the
only difference being that now the arithmetic is computed by taking modulo p.
Adding 2 points on the elliptic curve over GF (p)
LetR(xr,yr) = P +Q,P^-Q.
Then
s = (yq - Yp) / (x, - Xp) mod p
xr =
s2
- Xp - Xqmod p
yr = - yp + s (xp - Xr) mod p
Doubling the point P on the curve is mathematically expressed as follows
When yp is not 0,
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LetR(xr,yr) = 2P.
Then
s = (3 xp2+ a) / (2 yp) mod p
Xr =
s2
- 2xp mod p
Yr = " Yp + S (Xp - Xr) mod p.
5.2.2 Elliptic Curve Groups over binary extension fields
The non-super singular elliptic curve equation over binary fields is given as
2 3
y +xy = x +ax + b, where a, b are selected from the field GF (2m) and b f- 0.
Elliptic curve groups over binary fields GF (2m) can be represented in either polynomial
representation or normal basis representation as discussed in 4.4 and 4.5.
The points on the elliptic curve are such that x and y lie in the binary field.
Example
Consider the field GF (24) with irreducible polynomial f(x) =
x4 + x + 1 .
a = (0010) is the generator of the field and the powers ofa are
ao = (0001) ai=(0010) a2 = (0100) a3 = (1000)
34 = (0011) a5 = (0110) ae = (1100) 37= (1011)
38 = (0101) a9 = (1010) aio = (0111) an = (11 10)
ai2 = (llll) ai3 = (1101) a14 = (1001) ai5 = (0001)
Let the elliptic curve equation be
y2 + xy =
x3 + g2 x2 + 1, where a =
g2
and b = 1
There are 15 points that satisfy the above equationwhich are
(0, 1) (1, a12) (a5, a14) (a9, a10) (a6, a3) (a12, 0) (a5, a11) (a1, a12)
(1, a7) (a5, a9) (a9, a1) (a6, a7) (a12, a12) (a5, a13) (a1, a6)
Mathematical representation of addition and doubling on elliptic curve over GF
(2m)
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The formulae for point addition and point doubling are slightly different for binary fields
as compared to real numbers and prime fields.
Adding two points P and Q
LetR(xr,yr) = P + Q,P7t-Q.
Then
s = (yq-yP)/(xq-xp)
Xr = S +S + Xp + Xq
yr= yP + Xr +S(xp + Xr)
Doubling the point P on the curve is mathemsticslly expressed as follows -
When xp is 0, then 2P = 0
When xp is not 0, then
LetR(xr,yr) = 2P.
Then
s = xp + yp / xp
xr =
s2 + s + a
yr = Xp + (s + 1) * Xr\
5.3 Elliptic Curve (EC) Scalar Multiplication
The elliptic curve scalsr multiplicstion is the heart of the elliptic curve cryptosystem.
Scalsr multiplicstion involves computing kP; where k is an integer and P is a point on the
elliptic curve. This process is a one-way function and computing its inverse takes fully
exponential time.
The following figure depicts the hierarchy in computation of elliptic curve scalar
multiplication.
45
Elliptic Curve Point
Multiplication
Elliptic Curve
Point Addition
Field
Addition
Elliptic Curve
Point Doubling
Field
Multiplication
Field
Inversion
Fig 5.6: Hierarchy of arithmetic in EC scalarmultiplication
The elliptic curve scalsr or point multiplicstion is computed by repeated point additions
and point doublings. Adding and doubling a point over a field requires the following field
operations - field addition, multiplication, inversion and squsring.
To calculate kP, the point P is added to itselfk times
kP = P + P + P....+ P(k times).
This can also be represented a series ofpoint additions and doublings.
kP = P + . . .(2(2(. . .P + 2(P + 2(P + 2P)))
Example: Ifk =15 then
15P = P + 2(P + 2(P + 2P)).
Various algorithms have been proposed for the elliptic curve scalar multiplication
operation; which are discussed in Clrapter 6.
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5.4 Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)
The strength of the elliptic curve cryptosystems lies in the intractability of the elliptic
curve discrete logarithm problem [MEN95]. Like the discrete logarithm problem
discussed in Sec. 3.5, the one-way function for elliptic curve cryptosystems is computed
by the elliptic curve multiplication operation, which is finding kP where k is a random
integer and P is a point on the curve. This results in another point Q on the curve. The
ECDLP is based on the fact that knowing P and Q, there exists no sub exponential
algorithm to find k [ROS99]. k is the discrete logarithm ofQ to the base P.
There has been considerable research into solving the elliptic curve discrete logarithm
problem. Except for some cases like the super singular curves or when the order of the
point P is not prime, there has been little success. The fastest known technique is known
as the Pollard Rho method [HM04]. It has a running time of y/lln/ 2 elliptic curve
operations, which is still exponential n. The table below [ECC9] shows the time required
to solve the ECDLP inMIPS years using the Pollard Rho method.
Key Sizes MIPS Years
150 3.8* 101U
205 7.1 * IO18
234 1.6* 107S
Table 5.1: Computational Effort for Cryptanalysis ofDLP using Pollard Rho.
There are also no index-calculus methods for solving the ECDLP as there are for DLP
[Sec 3.5, HM04], because index calculus requires certsin mathematical properties to be
satisfied which are absent in elliptic curve groups, making them resistant to such attack.
The algorithms for solving ECDLP are much more difficult and time consuming [HM04],
which is why the elliptic curve cryptosystem can achieve similar levels of security with
smaller key lengths than public key schemes based on the DLP or integer factorization.
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5.5 Key Exchange Protocols for Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Many schemes have been proposed for secret sharing. Some of the popular key exchange
schemes are Diffie-Hellman and the ElGamal protocol. This section describes the Diffie-
Hellman and ElGamal protocol.
5.5.1 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Protocol (EC-DH)
Diffie-Hellman key exchange has been discussed in a previous chapter (Sec. 3.6.1). The
EC key exchange is similar to that one expect for the fact that elliptic curve scalar
multiplication is used as the one-way function instead ofexponentiation.
The Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol works as follows.
Assume Alice and Bob are the two people in the communication and they want to
generate a secret key. Both agree to use a specific curve, field size and representation of
elements in the field. They also select a base point B on the curve. All these parameters
are made public.
1 . Alice selects a random value kA
2. Alice computes kAB.
3. Alice sends kAB to Bob.
4. Bob selects a random value ke.
5. Bob then computes ksB and sends it to Alice.
6. Alice then computes kA (keB).
7. Bob computes kB (kAB), which is the shared secret.
The strength of the EC Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol lies in the fact that given
B, kAB and ks B it is difficult to compute ks kAB. This is because to compute ks kAB the
adversary would have to compute either kB or kA from ks B and kAB respectively, which
requires solving the ECDLP. The EC Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol too has no
known sub-exponential solution for a well-chosen set of parameters [FLOO]. These
parameters include selecting a non super singular curve with prime order, also the order
of the base point B of the curve should be prime. The same level of security can be
achieved using EC Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol utilizing lesser number ofkey-
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bits. For example, a 163-bit key elliptic curve technology offers the equivalent security
strength ofa 1024-bit RSA system [LDOO].
5.5.2 Elliptic Curve ElGamal Protocol
The elliptic curve ElGamal protocol is a very useful protocol for key exchange, digital
signature andmessage encryption. The steps involved in this protocol are as follows -
Assume Alice and Bob are the two people in the communication and they want to
generate a secret key. Both agree to use a specific curve, field size and representation of
elements in the field. They also select a base point B on the curve. All these parameters
are made public.
1 . Alice selects a random value kA
2. Alice computes PA = kAB.
3. Alice sends PA to Bob.
4. Bob selects a random value kB.
5. Bob then computes PB = kBB and sends it to Alice.
6. Suppose that Pm is the message point embedded on the curve and Alice
wants to send this to Bob.
7. Alice chooses a random bit pattern r, and computes two points
Pr = rB and
Ph = Pm + rPB.
8. Alice then sends both Pr and Ph to Bob.
9. Bob computes Ps = kB Pr and subtracts this from Ph
Pm=Ph Ps
5.6 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm is based on the EC
- ElGamal protocol.
This ECDSA is composed of 3 parts - ECDSA key generation, ECDSA signature
generation and ECDSA signature verification. The following steps illustrate this
algorithm.
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Alice and Bob agree to use a specific curve E, field size and representation ofelements in
the field. They also select a base point B on the curve oforder n. All these parameters are
made public.
ECDSA Key Generation
1 . Alice selects a random number kA from the interval [1, n-l]
2. Alice then computes PA = kAB.
Alice's private key is kA
Alice's public key is (E, B,PA).
ECDSA Signature Generation (to sign a message m)
1 . Alice chooses a random k from the interval [2, n- 1 ] .
2. Alice computes (xi, yi) = B * k.
3. Alice computes r = xi mod n (ifr = 0 then go to step 1).
4. Alice computes
k"1
mod n.
and s =
k"1 (SHA (m) + ar) mod n
(ifs = 0, go to step 1)
Signature for m = (r, s).
5. Alice sends (r, s) to Bob.
ECDSA Signature Verification:
1 . Bob receives (r, s) and verifies that they are integers in the interval [ 1 ,
n- 1 ] .
2. Bob computes w =
s"1
mod n and SHA (m).
3. Bob computes ui = SHA (m) w mod n and
u2 = rwmod n.
4. Bob computes uiB + u2 PA = (xo, yo)
and v = xo mod n
5. Bob accepts signature ifand only ifv = r.
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5.7 Embedding Raw Data on the Curve
In order to transmit a message using elliptic curve, the message has to be embedded on
the curve as a point. The message can then be encrypted and sent to the recipient. The
trick is to hide the plaintext on the curve along with some random bits. The maximum
number of bits that can be embedded on the curve is the field GF (2m) is m-4 [ROS99].
The plaintext is converted into binary format using some well-known algorithms. Plain
text can be represented in ASCII, which can then be converted into binary using ASCII to
binary conversion methods. Or a set of numbers could be assigned to the text, which is
known to both parties. This binary message is then appended with some random bits, the
values ofwhich can be changed to satisfy the curve equation. This is the x coordinate of
? 3
the message point. The equation y+xy-x+ax + b is then solved to get the y
coordinate of the message point. Then various protocols discussed above can be applied
to hide this point on the curve.
There exist only probabilistic methods for embedding plaintext on an elliptic curve.
There is no deterministic polynomial time algorithm for the same [ROS99].
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Chapter 6
Algorithms used in computation of the elliptic curve scalar multiplication
As seen in fig 5.6, the elliptic curve scalar multiplication is a series of point doublings
and point additions. Various algorithms have been proposed for point multiplication
which are discussed later in this chapter. These algorithms are divided into two important
cases i.e., generic point multiplication algorithms and fixed point algorithms. In the
generic case, multiplication is done using arbitrary points on the elliptic curve whereas
the point is fixed in fixed point multiplication [OPOOa]. Fixed point multiplication
algorithms are more efficient and faster than generic algorithms; however, they require
more precomputations and hence have more storage requirements. Some other factors
that influence speed of these algorithms include coordinate selection and selection of the
irreducible polynomial [BDT02].
6.1 Irreducible Polynomial
A polynomial which cannot be factored into smaller degree polynomials in the same field
is an irreducible polynomial. The degree of the irreducible polynomial is equal to "m" for
the field GF (2m). Multiplication and exponentiation operations in the finite field are
carried out modulo the irreducible polynomial. [IEE98, ANS99] standards recommend
the use of trinomials of the form xm+x +1 or pentanomials (xm +xa +x + xc + 1 )
as the irreducible polynomial because they greatly simplify implementations. Trinomials
(xm +xt
+1) as seen from the equation are polynomials with only 3 non-zero
coefficients and pentanomials have 5 non-zero coefficients. For elliptic curve arithmetic
in the field GF (2m), trinomials are of the form
xm+xt
+ 1 where 0 <t<m.
Pentanomials are of the form xm +xa + x + xc + 1 where 0<a,b,c<m and a*b*c.
An arbitrary irreducible polynomial can contain a maximum of m+1 non-zero
coefficients. [OPOOa] gives an approximate bit-complexity for using different irreducible
polynomials for GF (2m) arithmetic operations, assuming the number of non-zero
coefficients in the arbitrary polynomial is r + 1 .
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GF(2m) operation
Addition
Square
Multiplication
Irreducible Polynomial
Arbitrary
m
rm
2mz + (r-2)m-r+l
Trinomial
m
2m
2mz-l
Pentanomial
m
4m
2mz + 2m -3
Table 6.1: Irreducible Polynomial bit complexity for arithmetic operations [OPOOa]
The work described here uses trinomials or pentanomials depending on the field, for
implementation because it greatly simplifies implementation and enhances speed of
algorithms.
6.2 Coordinate representation
Another important factor that influences the speed of implementation is the coordinate
representation of the elliptic curve points. Using projective coordinates (X, Y, Z) instead
ofaffine coordinates (x, y), eliminates the need for inversion in the scalar multiplication
algorithm, which is the most expensive operation in terms of time and resources required
[BDT02].
6.2.1 Projective Space
Definition: "The projective space over a field F is the set ofequivalence classes of tuples
(Xo, Xi . . . Xn) (not all components zero) where two tuples are said to be equivalent if they
are scalar multiplies of one
another" [OSW02]. Such an equivalence class is called a
projective point, which means that a point (X, Y, Z) is the same point as (aX, aY, aZ)
where a * O.A point in the projective plane has three coordinates (X, Y, Z). The
conversion ofaffine (x, y) to projective is as follows:
X = x,Y = y,Z=l.
And Projective can be converted back to affine as
x =X/Z,y = Y/Z
Substituting the above values ofx and y in the nonsupersingular elliptic curve equation
5.1 we get the corresponding equation for an elliptic curve in projective coordinates:
Y2Z =
X3 +
aXZ2+ bZ3.
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6.2.2 Elliptic Curve Operations using Projective Coordinates
The following shows the mathematical formulae for elliptic curve point addition and
point doubling operations in projective coordinates.
Point Addition
Let P (Xo, Y0, Zo) and Q (Xi, Yu Zi) , P * -Q be the two points to be added and let
R(X2,Y2,Z2) = P + Q.
Then,
Let V = (X0Z,2 + X,Zo2 ) (Xo Zi2 - X,Zo2f - 2 X2
X2 =(Y0Z!3 - Y!Z03)2 +X1Zo2)(X0Z12 - X,Zo2)2
2Y2 =V(Y0Zi3 - Y!Zo3) - YjZo^tXoZ,2 - XZo2)3
Z2 = ZoZi (Xo Zi - XiZo )
Point Doubling
Let P (X,, Y,, Zi), R (X2, Y2, Z2) = 2 P.
X2=(3X12 + aZ14)2
Y2 = (3 Xi2 + a Zi4)(4 XiYi2 - X2) - 8 Yi4
Z2 = 2 Yi Zi
It can be seen from the above that point addition and point doubling using projective
coordinates do not require an inverse operation.
The table below shows a comparison of the number of operations required to perform a
point addition and double in affine and projective coordinates for the field GF (2m).
Operation Affine Projective
Point addition 1 inv + 2 mul + 1 sq 15mul + 5 sq
Point doubling 1 inv + 2 mul + 1 sq 5 mul + 5 sq
mul - multiplications
sq - squares
inv - inverse
Table 6.2: Number ofOperations in affine and projective coordinates
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The following table shows the bit complexities ofGF (2m) arithmetic operations
GF (2m) operation Bit complexity
Addition O(m)
Square O(rm)
Multiplication O(m^)
Inverse 0(m2log2 m)
Table 6.3: Complexity ofGl 7 (2m) arithmetic operations
It can be seen from table 6.3 that inverse is the most complex operation, m is in the order
of 163 to 571 for cryptographic applications [OPOOa]. Therefore, it is beneficial to use
projective coordinates which completely eliminate the need for inversion. Multiplication
in binary fields can be made faster by using different multiplication algorithms discussed
later. Using a digit multiplier, the complexity ofmultiplication is O (m/d), d is the digit
size, which is faster than the O (m2) multiplier.
6.3 Point Multiplication Algorithms
The most common algorithm for scalar or point multiplication is the double and add
algorithm which has also been documented in the IEEE 1363 draft for public key
cryptography standards. In this algorithm every bit ofk is scanned starting from the MSB
and ending at the LSB. If the bit is set (1), then a point double operation is performed. If
the bit is 0, a point addition is performed along with the point double. The double and add
method is illustrated in the pseudo-code below.
Input k = (km, km.i ki, ko), P, where k e 0, 1
Initialize Q = 0
for i = len(k)- 1 to i = 0 loop
ifki = 0then
Q = Q + P //ifbit is 0, theperformpoint addition
end if;
Q = 2Q //point doublefor each bit ofk
end loop;
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Output Q = kP
Ifhalf the bits are set or 1 in the binary representation ofk (k is m -bit ), then the double
and add algorithm requires
'm'
point doublings and km/2' point additions. The number of
operations can be minimized to m/3 additions by using addition-subtraction chains,
keeping the number of point doublings fixed [BDG02]. The addition-subtraction chain
method is also known as the Non Adjacent Form (NAF) method and is based on the fact
the computing the additive inverse ofP, i.e., -P is very simple as -P is the reflection ofP
along the X-axis (Sec. 5.1).
The NAF method for point multiplication is faster than the double and add method, k is
represented in NAF or signed binary representation, with smaller number of non-zero
digits. NAF is unique for every number. The algorithm for the NAF method is shown
below.
Input k = (km, km-i ki, ko), P, where ki 0, 1,-1
Initialize Q = 0
for i = len(k)- 1 to i = 0 loop
ifkj = 0then
Q = Q k; P //ifbit is 0, the perform point addition
end if;
Q = 2Q //point double for each bit
end loop;
Output Q = kP
Other methods were proposed by [AMV93, LKP03], where instead of using a random k,
the bits of k were selected such that k had a small Hamming weight (HW). Hamming
weight of a number is the number of non-zero bits in its binary representation. By
choosing k in this manner the number ofpoint additions could be minimized.
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The only difference between these two methods was that k in the [LKP03] method was
represented in signed binary representation, so that there were more possible choices for
k in a given number of bits. Both methods required m-1 doublings and w-1
additions/subtractions for a point multiplication operation (w being the HW ofk).
Method Point Doubling Point Addition
Double-and-Add m m/2
NAF method m m/3
[AMV93, LKP03 ] m-1 w-1
Table 6.4: Comparison of point multiplication algorithms
Table 6.4 shows a comparison ofthe point multiplication algorithms discussed in terms
ofnumber ofpoint doubling and point addition operations needed in each.
In fixed point algorithms, 2kP is precomputed for different values ofk and stored, since P
is fixed and known. These methods are faster than the generic algorithms discussed
above, but have more storage requirements for the precomputed values [OPOOa].
6.4 Montgomery PointMultiplication Algorithm for GF (2m)
This algorithm was introduced by [LD99] and it is an optimized version of the original
Montgomery method [OM98] for scalar multiplication in binary field. It is one of the
most efficient methods, requires no precomputations and is faster than other known
methods [LD99]. One of the fastest reported implementations of elliptic curve processor
[OPOOa] also uses this algorithm for point multiplication. The algorithm has been
proposed for both affine and projective coordinates. The projective coordinate version is
much more efficient [LD99].
The method starts by defining 3 points Pb P2 and P such that P2 = 2P and Pi
= P.
P is the difference P2 - Pi.
Montgomery's scalar multiplication algorithm illustrated in the following pseudo code.
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Input -P, k
Initialize - Pi = P and P2 = 2P
for i in len(k)-2 downto 0 loop
if ki = 1
Pi=Pi+P2
P2 =2P2 II V =P2-Pi =2P2 -Pi+P2
else
P2=Pi+P2
Pi =2Pi //P =P2-Pi =Pi+P2-2Pi
end if
end loop;
Output Pi = kP
At each step of the iteration the sum of two points P2 and Pi is computed using the x -
coordinates of the points only and the difference between the points is maintained
constant. The y coordinate is obtained at the end of the point multiplication process.
In the projective coordinate version of the algorithm the x coordinate is converted into
projective using X and Z in projective space as x = X/Z for both points Pi and P2. The y
coordinate is not used in this algorithm. The resulting coordinates of the point
multiplication process are converted back into affine.
The following is the pseudo code for the Montgomery scalar multiplication algorithm.
Pseudo Code for Elliptic Curve ScalarMultiplication
Inputs:
Elliptic Curve Parameters - Irreducible Polynomial, a, b
Coordinates ofpoint P x, y
Random key - k
1. Convert (x,y) to projective coordinates, (Xi,Zi,X2,Z2) = affinetoProjective(x,y)
2. for I = length (k)-2 downto 0
ifk (i) = 1 then
58
(Xh Zi) =madd (Xi,Zi, X2, Z2,x)
(X2,Z2) = mdouble (X2, Z2)
else
(X2,Z2) =madd (Xi,Zi,X2,Z2, x)
(Xi,Z0 =mdouble (Xi,Zi)
end if;
end for;
3. Convert back to affine (x, y) = projtoaffine (Xi, Zu X2, Z2, x, y)
Output (x, y) = k P
Functions:
/*Thisfunction converts the x coordinatefrom affine to projective. They coordinate is
not used in this algorithm */
affinetoProjective(x, y)
Xi=x;
Zi = l
X2 = x4 + b;
Z2 = x2
return (Xi,Zi,X2,Z2)
/*Thisfunctionperforms the point addition operation inprojective coordinates*/
madd(Xi,Zi,X2,Z2, x)
Xi = XiZ2X2Zi + x (X1Z2 + X2Z1)2
Z,=(XiZ2 + X2Zi)2
return(Xi,Zi)
/*Thisfunctionperforms thepoint doubling operation inprojective coordinates*/
mdouble(X.Z)
X = X^ + bZ4
Y = X2Z2
/*Thisfunction converts theprojective coordinates back into affine*/
projectivetoaffine(Xi,Zi,X2,Z2,x,y)
xk = Xi/Z,;
yk = ((X1/Z1 + x)(X2/Z2 + x) +
x2 + y)
* (X1/Z1+ x)/x + y)
return(xk,yk)
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The algorithm starts by converting the x coordinates of Pi and P2 into projective form
using function affinetoProjective (x, y). The relation between Pi and P2 (Pi- P2 = P) is
maintained at each step of the iteration. Ifki = 1; Pi is set to Pi+ P2 and P2 is set to 2 P2
Similarly when ki is 0, then P2 is set to Pi+ P2 and Pi is set to 2 Pi Pi contains the value
ofkP at the end of the iteration, which is converted back to affine coordinates at the end
of the iteration process. As can be seen from the pseudo code there is no inversion
operation; except in a last step ofcoordinate conversion (projectivetoaffine ()).
This method has less storage requirements and computational complexity. The following
table lists the number of multiplications, squares and inversions required in the scalar
multiplication process usingMontgomery's algorithm.
Multiplications Squares Inverses
6m +10 5m + 3 1
Table 6.5: Computational complexity ofMontgomery point multiplication algorithm
[OPOOa]
6.5 Inversion Algorithm
Some of the most commonly used algorithms for inversion in finite binary fields are the
Extended Euclidean Algorithm [MOV96], Fermat's Little Theorem [OPOOb], Look up
Table [PAR95] method and the Itoh-Tsujii [IT88] algorithm.
The Euclidean algorithm is used for calculating the greatest common divisor (GCD) of
two numbers. It states that the GCD of two numbers can be expressed as a linear
combination of the two numbers. If F(x) is the irreducible polynomial in the field GF
(2n), then this algorithm states that GCD (F(x), A(x))
= 1 (A is an element ofGF (2n)) and
there exists a polynomial B(x) which for some C(x) satisfies the equation
A(x)B(x) + C(x)F(x) = l
i.e., A(x) B(x) = 1 mod F(x).
B(x) is the inverse ofA(x) in GF (2n).
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This computation is based on repeated application of the division-mod algorithm and
therefore the Extended Euclidean algorithm can also be used to find the inverse of an
element in finite field.
A simpler method is the look up table based method where the inverses and field
elements are precomputed and stored. This requires a lot ofstorage and because fields are
large for cryptographic applications, it is used generally for subfield inversion and finds
use in block ciphers [PAR95].
The Itoh-Tsujii method is very popular for use in binary finite fields with normal basis
representation. This is because it is an exponentiation based method and exponentiation
can be computed fairly easily in normal basis. Squaring in normal basis is simply a cyclic
shift ofcoefficients. [GP02] proposed a method for adapting the Itoh-Tsujii algorithm for
polynomial basis. However this is efficient for only certain classes of finite field because
complexity ofexponentiation is lower in these classes.
The elliptic curve processor prototyped in this work used the Fermat's Little Theorem for
computing inverse. This method is not restricted to a particular form of extension field
and is a simple algorithm, which is easy to implement and takes up less code space
[GBK01]. It is also an exponentiation-based method and does not require any
precomputataions. Fermat's theorem requires [log2 (n-l) + HW (n-l) -1] multiplications
and k-1 squarings in GF (2n) [PAR95].
6.5.1 Fermat's Little Theorem
The theorem states that for anyAs GF (2m), the inverse is computed as follows
A-l=A(2^-2)
The exponentiation is computed using the left-to-right binary exponentiation method.
If L is the length of the binary representation of the exponent then left-to-right binary
exponentiation algorithm performs L squarings andN - 1multiplications with the number
where N is the number of l's in the binary representation ofthe exponent. The number of
multiplications can be reduced by forming addition chains (a sequence of pairs which
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satisfy certain mathematical properties and reduce multiplication to addition), but
determining the shortest addition chain is aNP- hard mathematical problem [MOV96].
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Chapter 7
This chapter describes the entire design and implementation cycle. Also the tools,
language and methodology used in the implementation are discussed. An introduction to
the target FPGA, its architecture, advantages and disadvantages are also presented here.
Design and Implementation Steps
1 . Define design specification/ goals
2. Define design in VHDL
3. Simulate the source code (Design verification)
4. If simulation works, synthesize, optimize, place and route and download on
target FPGA
5. Test Design
All the steps are interrelated and are not in any definite order. Each step needs to be
retraced at some point in the process, to ensure correct implementation.
7.1 Methodology
The design of the ECP was developed in VHDL and placed on an FPGA. Functional
simulation of the various blocks was carried out to ensure proper functionality. The ECP
was tested using various test vectors. The test vectors for the coordinates of the point
were generated using a random number generator coded in lava. Another Java code was
written to generate the elliptic curve parameters. The instruction set for the algorithm
used in the point multiplication process is loaded into the instruction memory of the
target FPGA. The instruction set is specified in a ".mif ' file for Altera and a ".coe" file
for Xilinx FPGA. The instruction memory is configured to read the instructions from the
files. Both the instruction memory and data memory are configured as dual port RAMs
(DPRAM). They can therefore be accessed by the host machine through 32-bit/66 Mhz
PCI interface [XILINX]. Also the DPRAM configuration allows the host processor to
load different programs without having to reconfigure the elliptic curve processor.
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7.2 Overview ofVHDL
The elliptic curve processor architecture was developed using Very High Speed
Integrated Circuit Hardware Description Language (VHDL). VHDL is a programming
language for digital hardware. VHDL was adopted as a standard in 1987 [WSC89].
There are many advantages of using VHDL for modeling digital hardware. One of the
biggest advantages is that VHDL allows reusability of design. Various components like
flip flops, registers, memory etc can be used in many different designs. Model libraries
can be made for most commonly used function blocks. VHDL is also accepted as a
standard and has both Government and Industry support.
VHDL code is portable. The code developed for this thesis was compiled and simulated
for both Altera and Xilinx platforms. VHDL is also foundry and technology independent
which makes it easier for the designer to code without having to wait for selecting a
particular technology. Another important aspect ofVHDL is that the design can be built
using modules, which can be later integrated into a complete system. This simplifies the
design process. Also it helps to debug and functionally simulate each unit separately.
7.3 CAD Tools
Two CAD tools were used for the two target FPGAs available. Typical design flow
through a CAD tools is as follows -
1 . Design Entry
2. Translation
3. Optimization and Synthesis
4. Device Fitting
5. Simulation
6. Device Programming
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7.4 Target FPGA
Two different FPGAs were used to prototype the elliptic curve processor. The Xilinx
FPGA has more number of gates, dual ported memory and incorporate fast carry logic.
The Altera FPGA has dual port memory, lesser number ofgates and was used to compare
the performance of the elliptic curve processor on two different platforms. Some of the
features ofboth the FPGAs are highlighted below.
Altera Flexl0K70
The Flex device is a SRAM-based FPGA. It has 70,000 gates with 3,744 logic elements
(LE), 468 logic array blocks (LAB), 9 embedded array blocks (EAB) and 18,432 RAM
bits. The Flex device is built on a UP2 education board, which also includes aMAX 7000
(CPLD) device. There are 240 I/O pins on the board.
Xilinx Virtex XCV1000bg560
The Virtex device has 27, 648 logic cells, 1,124,022 system gates and 3 speed grades.
This is also a SRAM-based FPGA. It has configurable logic blocks (CLB), which are
similar to the LABs in the Flex device. The board provides 404 PO pins.
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7.5 Platform Options
The figure below shows the various available platform options for implementing the
elliptic curve processor.
Elliptic Curve Processor Implementation
Hardware Software
ASIC FPGA Intel, RISC
Fig 7.1: Platform Options
EmbeddedMicroprocessor
Elliptic curve cryptosystems have been successfully implemented on most of these
platforms [Sec 2.1, 2.2].
Some of the desired characteristic of the elliptic curve processor are - space effective,
power efficient, cost effective, small design and development cycle and flexible, which
lends itself easily to customization. This is necessary because the design of the elliptic
curve cryptosystem is targeted for use in constrained environments such as mobile
devices and smart cards.
The table below summarizes the features ofeach implementation platform.
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Performance Cost Power Flexibility Design
Effort
ASIC High High Low Low High
Processor Medium/Low Medium/Low Medium High/Medium Medium/Low
Reconfigurable
Hardware
High/Medium Medium/Low High/Medium High/Medium Medium/Low
Table 7.1 : Features of Implementation Platforms
ASIC-based implementations provide very high performance, consume less power and
have a smaller chip count for the overall design. However designing in ASIC requires
considerable effort, long fabrication time which leads to longer design cycles. They are
also not flexible and are usually very expensive [EYCOO].
Software based applications are flexible and do not take as long to develop. They provide
medium performance level and have medium cost. The instructions in any software
language are execute sequentially so parallelism cannot be well exploited. Also the
hardware used is not specialized for a specific function. They also consume high power.
7.5.1 Reconfigurable Hardware
Reconfigurable hardware includes devices in which the functionality of logic gates is
customizable at runtime. It is a general-purpose hardware configured for a specialized
function. Implementation on the reconfigurable platform is highly flexible in the sense
that the algorithms and system parameters can be changed at any time by reconfiguration.
It gives reasonable performance with low cost compared to ASIC implementations
[EYCOO]. ASIC lose the flexibility to adapt to circuit changes once manufactured. ASICs
are not manufactured in large volumes because they have rigid fabrication rules, such as
0.35 or 0.5 micron, whereas FPGAs are manufactured in large quantities as they can
easily be migrated to the best available fabrication technology and are therefore cost
effective [XILINX]. The reconfigurable hardware approach combines the speed and
concurrency of hardware with the flexibility of software. Therefore this is a good
platform for implementing cryptographic applications.
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7.6 Introduction to FPGA
Field Programmable gate array (FPGA) is an integrated circuit whose internal functional
operation is defined by the user. The user specifies the function after the device has been
manufactured, and all function changes can take place at the user's site.
An FPGA contains several copies of programmable logic element or logic block. These
logic blocks are used to implement digital logic i.e., logic gates. Logic elements are
connected to one another on the chip using a programmable interconnection network.
Maximum clock rates that can be obtained using FPGA devices are in the range of 50
MHz to 200MHz [XILINX].
The logic blocks in a FPGA are organized in an array with interconnection network
between them.
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There are basically two types ofFPGA
1 . SRAM (Static RandomAccess Memory)-based FPGA
2. One-time Programmable FPGA.
SRAM-based FPGAs use SRAM to define the logic and SRAM-controlled interconnect
switches whereas One-time Programmable FPGA use anti-fuse switches.
7.6.1 Configurable Logic Blocks (CLB) or Logic Array Blocks (LAB)
These form the heart of the FPGA device. They contain the programmable logic for
designing different logic functions. These blocks are also used as RAM/ROM blocks or
registers for storage. They provide dedicated capability for high-speed arithmetic
functions. They can also serve as routing elements because they have multiplexers to
route logic within the block and to and from external resources.
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Altera devices have logic array blocks (LABs) which are macrocells combined into
groups of 16 [ALTERA]. The architecture of a logic array block is shown in the figure
above. The programmable interconnect routes data to or from LABs or external pins on
the device.
GOUT
Fig 7.4: 2-Slice Virtex CLB [XILINX]
Xilinx devices have a more complex logic element called CLB. Each CLB includes 4, 4-
input loop-up table (LUT), carry logic and a storage element. Outputs from the LUTs can
be fed into flip flops and routed to other CLBs.
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7.6.2 Input/Output Blocks (IOB)
The Input/Output blocks provide the interface between the package pins and the
configurable logic blocks (CLB). These transmit the signals from the chip and the host.
Each block can be used either as an input or output or a bidirectional signal. The input
buffer accepts different threshold levels, typically CMOS and TTL, so that the FPGA can
interface to these devices. Similarly the output buffer is configurable so that the FPGA
can output the most standard TTL or CMOS levels. All the IOBs not used in the
configuration are set to high- impedance state in order to isolate the internal logic.
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Chapter 8
Elliptic Curve Processor (ECP)
The architecture proposed for the elliptic curve processor is a RISC (Reduced Instruction
Set Computer) - based architecture, prototyped on an FPGA.
The elliptic curve processor can be easily reprogrammed to use different algorithms by
changing the instructions. The arithmetic unit ofthe processor is designed to support
finite field arithmetic.
Instr. Mem. - InstructionMemory
DataMem. - DataMemory
Fig 8.1: High-level view of the ECP
The proposed processor architecture can be adapted to any kind of extension field and
elliptic curve. Pipelining is introduced so as to maximize instruction throughput. The
ECP processor is built on the MIPS (Microprocessor without Interlocked Pipeline Stages)
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processor core for RISC-based systems. This is a specialized cryptographic processor and
not a modified general purpose CPU. A complete description of the MIPS core can be
found in [PH97]. The ECP is a low-power processor, which is an important consideration
for using it in constrained environments. The method used to reduce power consumption
in the ECP is termed as clock gating i.e., ifa certain part ofa processor is not needed for
a given operation, then it does not require the clock signal. In absence of the clock signal
there is no switching, and since switching requires power, its absence results in lower
power consumption.
reset
(1-bit)
fe + xk
h
Elliptic Curve
Processorw ? yk
w ? status (1
bit)
w
Input - x,y - co-ordinates ofP , integer k
Output - Xk,yk - co-ordinates ofkP
Fig 8.2: Basis Processor Operation
8.1 Basic Operation
The host enters the parameters for the scalar multiplication. Upon receiving the
parameters, the ECP starts the processing using instructions from the instruction memory.
Instructions are loaded into the instruction memory using the *.mif or the *.coe file The
coordinates are first converted from affine to projective and then Montgomery's point
multiplication algorithm discussed above is used for computing the point multiplication.
The host can also input parameters for the next multiplication before the first one
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completes. After completion of the multiplication, the ECP outputs a
'done'
status. The
host can now read the result of the multiplication operation from the ECP.
8.2 Architecture ofProcessor:
IDGCMamRaad
8.3: Block Diagram of the Processor showing Pipeline Stages [PH97]
8.2.1 Datapath
The instruction and data memory can connect the Elliptic curve processor with the PCI
(Peripheral Component Interconnect) bus of the host system, as these are dual ported
RAM memorywhich have interfacing capability provided by both Altera and Xilinx. The
data bus, register file and data memory is 163 bits wide. The address bus is 8-bit and the
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instruction length is 32-bit. The instruction memory and data memory are built using
standard macros available for the target FPGA. It has 22 (163-bit) general purpose
registers.
The instructions are executed in a 5-stage datapath - instruction fetch, instruction decode,
execute, memory and write-back.
8.2.2 Instruction Set of the Elliptic Curve Processor
The processor incorporates 32-bit instructions.
Format of Instructions
Field Size 6-bits 5-bits 5-bits 5-bits 5-bits 6-bits
R-format Opcode Rs Rj Rd Shift Function
I-format Opcode Rs Rr Address/immediate value
J-format Opcode Branch Target Address
Rs - register containing operand 1
Rt - register containing operand 2
Rd - register containing result
Table 8.1: Format of Instructions
As seen from the figure above, ECP has three instruction formats. The R-format
instructions perform operations on data in the registers. These operate on two operands
and the result is stored in the register. The I-format instructions are the load and store
instructions which reference the memory. The J-format instructions include the branch
and Jump instructions.
Instruction Set
Instruction Syntax Format
Load LOADRs_RT I
Store STORE Rs,Rt I
Add (XOR) ADD Rs, Rd , Rt R
Multiply MUL Rs, Rd , RT R
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Square SQ Rs, RT R
Inverse INVRs, Rt R
Shift Left SLL R
Branch on equal BEQ Rs, RT J
Jump JMP J
Table 8.2: Instruction Set
This limited instruction set is adequate to realize the Montgomery scalar multiplication
algorithm. The complete assembly language code for computing the point multiplication
is available in Appendix.
8.2.3 ControlUnit
The control unit takes as input the instruction opcode and generates control signals for
different units in the processor. Depending on the opcode, it decides the type of
instruction. It also examines the instructions for hazards that may result from pipelining
instructions and sends appropriate signals to the exception units to resolve the hazards
and to the different pipelined registers in the processor. The control unit is designed using
finite state machines.
8.2.4 Exception Units
The processor incorporates two units for handling exceptions that may occur in the
normal flow of instructions. These units are the forwarding unit and the hazard detection
unit.
Forwarding Unit
The forwarding unit, which is also known as register-bypassing is used to eliminate data
hazard stalls. Using this hardware, an instruction needing a result from a previous
instruction need not wait for the previous instruction to write data back to the register file.
The forwarding unit forwards the result to the instruction needing it directly from where
it was produced.
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Hazard Detection Unit
The hazard detection unit detects a load instruction followed by an instruction that used
the loaded value and a stall cycle is introduced. The stall cycle is needed even with the
forwarding unit in place.
8.2.5 Register File
The ECP has 22 registers, each ofwhich holds a 163-bit value. Registers address are 5-bit
long. Register numbers 1, 3, 6, and 20 are dedicated to store the input parameters x, b, y
and k respectively. The register file supports 2 reads and 1 write.
8.3 Arithmetic Unit Architecture
The arithmetic unit consists of4 structures -the multiplier, squarer, the basic ALU for
add and shift operations and the zero detection unit.
MUL
SLL - Shift left
Registers
SQR XOR SLL
MUX
ZERO DETECT
DataMemory
Fig 8.4: Arithmetic Unit
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The zero detect unit verifies that the result from the ALU is not zero. The arithmetic unit
gets the m-bit operands from the register file. Depending on the control signal, the
appropriate operation is performed. The result obtained from the arithmetic unit is
compared to ascertain that it is not zero and is written back to the registers or to the data
memory.
8.3.1 Multiplier
The architecture of the multiplier is a digit serial/parallel architecture proposed by
[HGK03]. This type ofmultiplier is versatile as it can work over a wide range of finite
fields and is not restricted to a particular form of irreducible polynomial. The multiplier is
scalable in the sense that the digit size can be selected as desired.
The fundamental idea behind the digit-serial architecture is that more than one bit at a
time is processed. It gives a fair tradeoff between space and performance. A new method
for degree reduction is also proposed by [HGK03].
The table below summarizes the time-area requirements for different multiplier
architectures for the field GF (2m).
Type Area complexity Time Complexity
Bit-Parallel O(m^) 0(1)
Bit-Serial O(m) O(m)
Digit-serial O(mD) 0(m/D)
D - digit size.
Table 8.3: Time-area analysis for multiplier architectures [HGK03]
There are two approaches for digit-serialmultiplication:
1 . Least Significant Digit (LSD) First Architecture
2. Most Significant Digit (MSD) First Architecture
In the Least Significant Digit First mode, the multiplication takes place from right-to-left,
whereas, it is the opposite in the Most Significant Digit First mode.
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[SP96] compares the hardware requirements, latency and critical-path length of both the
above approaches. The partial product obtained in the LSD approach is m+d-2 bits while
that obtained by MSD is m-1 bits long for the field GF (2m) (d is the digit size), so less
number of bits have to be stored in the MSD approach. Also the latency in the MSD
approach is [m/d] clock cycles whereas it is [m/d] +1 cycles in LSD first architecture.
The implementation given here uses the MSD multiplier architecture.
Let A and B be the two polynomials to be multiplied.
m-1
A = 2 a;
x1
i = 0
m-1
B = S bi x*
i = 0
Now, in the bit serial approach, one bit ofB will be multiplied with A in each clock cycle
C = A * B = A(x) . B(x) mod P(x)
where P(x) is the irreducible polynomial ofdegree m.
C = [ b0 A(x) + bi x A(x) + ....+bm-i x m-i A(x)] mod P(x).
The above equation can be rewritten as follows by grouping multiplies ofx and factoring
out x
C(x) = [... [[A(x) bm-i ] x mod P(x) + A(x) bm.2] x mod P(x) + ...+ A(x) bi] x mod
P(x) + A(x)b0
In the digit-serial approach, instead ofmultiplying one bit ofB at a time, d-bits ofB are
inputted (d - digit size), thereby reducing the number ofclock cycles needed to m/d.
The digit size d can be selected as desired.
B can be represented as follows
d-1
B = S bi.d+jXJ for0<i<m-2
j = 0
(mmodd)-l
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B-S bjd+j xj for i = m-1
i = 0
Using this representation, the algorithm forMSD first multiplication is as shown below;
C(0) = 0
For k in 1 to m/d loop
Z (k) = A [m-1 downto 0] * B [((m/d-k)*d+ (d-1)) downto ((m/k-k)*d)]
C (k) = C (k-1) + shiftjeft (Z (k), d)
end loop.
In each iteration, A is multiplied with d bits ofB, resulting in an m+d-1 bit polynomial.
This has to be reduced to degree m-1. So, instead ofcarrying out the reduction process at
the end, each computation of Z (k) is reduced to degree m-1. Therefore higher degree
polynomials do not have to be stored.
Degree Reduction
To reduce Z (k) modulo P (x), a new and efficient method for degree reduction proposed
by [HGK03] is used.
A polynomial y(x) ofdegree d-1 is used so that
Z (x) + P (x) Y (x) = T (x) = Z (x) mod P (x)
The computation of the coefficients of Y (x) is fairly easy and requires only AND and
XOR gates as demonstrated by the following example.
Example: The computation ofY (x) for d = 4 is as shown
For z(x) + p(x) y(x) = z(x) mod p(x) , the d most significant bits of p(x)y(x) and z(x)
must be identical. This fact is used to compute the coefficients ofy.
y3 = zn
y2 = Zl0 + P7-Zn
yi = Z9 + p7. Z]0 + P7-ZH + P6. Zn
y0 = Zg + P7- Zio + p7. Zn + p6. Zio + P5- Zn
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Also when trinomials or pentanomials are used as the irreducible polynomial in, most of
the coefficients ofP (x) are zero, therefore most ofthe coefficients ofY (x) become
coefficients ofZ (x), which is a simple assignment.
8.3.2 SquarerArchitecture
The squarer architecture used in this work is a bit-parallel architecture proposed by
[WU99] i.e., the square can be computed in one clock cycle. The architecture makes use
ofonly XOR gates and so the net delay is considerably less. This squarer is designed for
trinomials or pentanomials as the irreducible polynomial, which results in a smaller gate
count and small critical path length than using other arbitrary irreducible polynomials.
When the irreducible trinomial is used to generate the field GF (2n), closed form
expressions are developed using the coefficients of the input polynomial.
The irreducible trinomial is represented by the equation f(x) =
x1"+ xk + 1 where 1 < k <
m/2.
The squaring algorithm uses three cases for k = 1, 1 < k < m/2 and k = m/2.
If the input polynomial is A =a; x1 for i between 0 and m-1
The square ofA is given by
A2
= X a;
x21for i between 0 and m-1
= a;
x1 for i between 0 and 2m-2
and
a; = ai/2 if i is even
= 0 otherwise
Example
Iff(x) =
x5 + x2+l
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Let A be the input polynomial A = J>i x' and C =cj x; be the output polynomial ,
Then
Co = ao + ai
Ci = a4
c2 = a2
C3 = ao + 84
C4 = a3
Ao Ai A2 A3 A4
e
Co Ci C2 C3 C4
Fig 8.5: Example ofSquarer
The number ofXOR gates required for the squarer is (m-l)/2 and time delay is 2 times
the delay ofan XOR gate.
8.3.3 Inversion Architecture
The inverse is computed using Fermat's Little theorem. The inverse operation is
performed only once when converting projective coordinates back to affine coordinates.
The equation for computing inverse is
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A-l=A2m-2
The exponentiation is performed using the left-to-right binary exponentiation. The
squarings and multiplications required are performed using the squarer and multiplier.
Thus, the inversion operation is basically a combination ofmultiplications and squarings.
Pseudo Code for the inversion operation
INPUT: A, m
OUTPUTA-^A2^-2
Calculate k = 2m - 2 , k; e 0, 1
Initialize t = 1
for i in m-1 downto 0 loop
t = t*t
if ki = l,then
t = t* A
end if
end loop
Return t = A"1
Example:
To calculate A165
165 = 10100101
i 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
ki 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
t A A2 As A1U AM A41 A*2 Ai,
The binary representation ofk = 2m - 2 is scanned starting from the most significant bit.
In each iteration a variable t is multiplied to itself. If the scanned bit is a 1, then t is
multiplied with A.
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Chapter 9
9.1 Results and Performance Analysis
This chapter discusses the results obtained from the implementation of the elliptic curve
processor on an FPGA. Timing and area results are obtained for all the major modules in
the design and for the entire system.
Two Target FPGAs were used for the implementation - Altera FlexlOK70 and Xilinx
Virtex XCV1000. The Xilinx FPGA has more number of gates, dual ported memory and
incorporates fast carry logic. It also has 404 input-output pins enabling higher order field
designs to be successfully tested. The Altera FPGA has dual port memory, lesser number
ofgates and was used to compare the performance of the elliptic curve processor on two
different platforms.
The elliptic curve processor was tested for different field sizes. First the results obtained
from the combinatorial structures are presented and then for the scalar multiplication
process. For the combinatorial elements the development tools provided information
about the maximum path delay, which describes the longest path in the design. Area
results indicate the utilization of the combinatorial elements in the FPGA (i.e., CLB or
LAB), which is a standard way of defining area utilization of FPGA implementations.
Due to very long compile and place and route times and limited system resources, some
of the area results for the higher order fields had to be estimated through linear
approximation, since area increased linearly with the field size. Timing results were
obtained from Synopsys synthesis for designs with very long compilation time, which
were fairly close to those obtained from implementation on the FPGA device.
9.1.1 Addition
Addition in field GF (2n) is simply an XOR operation and so it is bit-parallel with O (1).
The results obtained are tabulated below.
ms - milliseconds
ns - nanoseconds
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Using FlexlOK70
Field Size n Area (LAB) Path (ns)
8 8 25.6
113 113 25.6
155 155 25.6
163 163 25.6
Table 9.1a: Addition results in FLEX 10K70
UsingXCV1000-6
Field Size n Area Logic (CLB) Path (ns)
8 8 8.198
113 113 8.198
155 155 8.198
163 163 8.198
Table 9.1b: Addition results in XCV1000
Since addition is bitwise XOR the timing results are similar for any size of the field.
Moreover, the gate utilization increases linearly with increase in field size. The area
results are the utilization ofthe logic blocks in the FPGA, which implement the gates i.e.,
the LAB in Flex and CLB in the Virtex device. Also the results obtained on the Virtex
were far better than on the Flex device.
9.1.2 Multiplication
Multiplication is an expensive operation in terms of resources needed. Different digit
sizes were used to show how the multiplier architecture scales for the Xilinx device.
Results are obtained for digit sizes 4, 16, 32.
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Using FlexlOK70 - Digit Size - 4 bits
Field Size n
8
113
155
163
Area (LAB)
77
Path (ns)
31.0
Design does not fit into device.
Table 9.2a: Multiplication results in Flexl0K70
For larger field sizes, the multiplier does not fit into the Altera device as it is a small
device in terms ofLABs present on the chip.
Using XCV1000 -6 - Digit Size - 4 bits
Field Size n Area (CLB) Path (ns)
8 63 16.575
113 889 325.848
155 1220 446.952
163 1283 470.028
Table 9.2.1b: Multiplication results in XCV1000 with d = 4
Using XCV1000 -6 - Digit Size - 16 bits
Field Size n Area (CLB) Path (ns)
113 1298 245.040
155 1780 336.11
163 1872 353.464
Table 9.2.2b: M ultiplication results in XCV1 000 with d = 16
Using XCV1000 -6 - Digit Size - 32 bits
Field Size n Area (CLB) Path (ns)
113 1837 226.342
155 2519 310.469
163 2649 326.493
Table 9.2.3b: Multiplication results in XCV 000with d = 32
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The timing results for 16-bit and 32-bit digit are almost similar, indicating that the speed
does not increase linearly with the digit size. When the digit size is higher, the number of
multiplications to be performed is lesser and so the multiplication processing time
decreases [Sec. 8.3.1]. However there is an increase in the number of squarings and
addition operations required, which relatively increases the processing time. There is an
appreciable speedup as digit size increases from 8 to 16. However this speedup is
relatively constant from d = 16 to d = 32. Area increases with digit size. A good choice
for the digit size for cryptographic implementations would be between 4 and 16.
9.1.3 Inversion
This is the most time and resource consuming operation.
Using FlexlOK70
Field Size n Area (LAB) Path(ns)
8 87 238.1
113 Design does not fit in device.
155
163
Table 9.3a: Inversion results in FlexlOK
Using XCV1000
Field Size n Area (CLB) Path (ns)
8 42 102.733
113 593 1451
155 813 1990
163 855 2093
Table 9.3b: Inversion results in XVC1000
The time taken for an inversion operation, obtained from synthesis on the target FPGA,
for the field GF (2163) is about 2.1 ms indicating that inversion is a slow operation. For
2Am-2
=A254the field GF (28), an inversion ofelement A would be calculated as
A"1
= A
254 is represented in binary as (11111110)2, so the inversion operation requires 8
squarings and 6 multiplications (Sec 6.5.1). For higher order fields, the number of ls in
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the binary representation of 2Am-2 is higher, increasing the number of operations.
2A163-2 is a very large number of the order of IO49, and inversion in this field requires
log(10 ) squarings and !/2(log(1049) +1) multiplications. Since inversion is required only
in a last step in theMontgomery multiplication algorithm when projective coordinates are
converted back into affine, this result does not affect the overall scalar multiplication
operation. However if affine coordinates where used in the implementation, where
inversion operation is needed in every point double and point addition, the scalar
multiplication would indeed be quite slow.
9.1.4 Squaring
Using FlexlOK70
Field Size n Area (LAB) Path (ns)
8 8 12.8
113 113 15.6
155 155 15.6
163 163 15.6
Table 9.4a: Squaring results in FlexlOK
Using XCVlOOOField Size n Area (CLB) Path (ns)
8 8 8.495
113 113 8.495
155 155 8.495
163 163 8.495
Table 9.4lb: Squaring results in XCV1000
The squarer implemented is a bit parallel squarer made up ofXOR gates. The square can
be computed in 8.5 ns on the Virtex and on 15.6 ns on the Flex.
9.1.5 Scalar Multiplication Process
This is the most important operation in elliptic curve cryptosystems. The scalar
multiplication process is a series ofpoint additions and point doublings, which in turn are
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composed of field addition, inversion and multiplication operations. Inversion is
eliminated by using projective coordinates for the representation of points on the elliptic
curve.
Using FlexlOK70
Field Size n Area (LAB) Speed (ns)
8 212 64.9
113
Does not fit into specified device155
163
Table 9.5a: Scalar Multiplication results in FlexlOK
Using XCV1000
Field Size n Area (CLB) Speed (ns)
8 155 57.376 (17.429MHz)
113 2192 810.436
155 3006 1111
163 3440 1169
Table 9.5b: Scalar Multiplication resu ts in XCV1000
For larger field sizes the design does not fit into the Flex device as it has only 468 LABs.
Device Utilization is 56% for 163-bit scalar multiplication on the Virtex XCV1000. The
entire scalar multiplication can be computed in 1.16 ms.
Power Consumption
The power consumption measured for the Virtex device is 32.57MW. The power
consumption was computed using the XPower tool available with the Xilinx ISE.
XPower estimates the power the design consumes.
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9.2 Comparison with other implementations
The elliptic curve processor developed in this work performs a scalar multiplication
operation in 1.16 milliseconds for GF (2163). The following table compares the
performance with other leading implementations ofelliptic curve cryptosystems.
Implementation Fields Platform Time
[AMV93] GF (2ni) VLSI
40 MHz
3.9ms est.
[SES98] GF (2n5) VLSI
40 MHz
18.4 ms
[Ros98] GF (((24)2)71 Xilinx FPGA
XC4062, 16MHz
4.5 ms
[LMWOO] GF(2UJ) Xilinx FPGA
XCV300, 45MHz
3.7 ms
[OPOOa] GF (2lb/) Xilinx FPGA
XCV400E,
76.7MHz
0.21ms
[OTI00] GF(21W) Altera EPF10K250 45 ms
[GBK01] GF(2,28-2y/-l) TI MSP430x33x, 1
MHz
3.4sec
[AYKOO] GF(p) 32-bit ARM,
80MHz
44.8 ms
[WBPOO] GF((25-17)") Intel 8051 8.37sec
Table 9.6: Comparison with past implementations
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Chapter 10
10.1 Summary
This thesis presents a 163-bit implementation ofan elliptic curve processor for GF (2n) on
reconfigurable hardware. The processor is capable of performing the main operation of
elliptic curve cryptosystems, which is the elliptic curve scalar multiplication. This
operation can be performed by the processor in 1.16msec which is considerably faster
than most ofthe other documented implementations. Since for fields greater than 100, the
place and route caused the system to crash, the timing results for these fields were
obtained from synthesizing the design using Synopsys. In a practical setting, better tools
and resources would be used to place the design on the target device, leading to better
results. Another implementation [OTI00] on the Altera FPGA device is slower than
implementations on Xilinx as demonstrated from the results in this thesis. The design by
[LUT03] is the fastest reported implementation ofECC, which uses the Look up Tables
for multiplication and squarings, leading to extremely fast calculations. Also the
implementation is optimized for specific fields and Koblitz curves.
The architecture used for the processor is the popular MIPS architecture, which performs
finite field arithmetic as opposed to the normal arithmetic. So the elliptic curve processor
is basically a general-purpose processor with a specialized function. The design of the
processor is highly flexible; it can be reprogrammed easily by changing the instructions
in the instruction memory. Also new instructions can be incorporated as needed.
10.2 Recommendation for furtherwork
The elliptic curve parameters have to be loaded into the registers before the start of
processing. It is a good idea to implement generation ofrandom curves and points on the
chip itself which will make it more practical.
The run time reconfiguration feature of FPGAs can be exploited for future research
which would dynamically reconfigure the FPGA with different algorithms, functional
units or a different cryptographic processor altogether.
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Another consideration would be to have multiple functional units to further increase the
speed of computations since most of the algorithms can be parallelized, keeping in mind
the area requirements especiallywhen developed for constrained environments.
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Appendix A
Matlab Code for Scalar Multiplication
% File - madd.m
% This is the montgomery add function used for point addition
% Author - Aarti Malik
% Last Updated - 03/18/04
Q.
O
function [X11,Z11]= madd (XI, Z1,X2, Z2,x)
Xll = (( XI * Z2) * (X2 * ZI )) + x * (((XI * Z2) + (X2 * ZI)) * ((XI *
Z2) + (X2 * ZI) ) ) ;
Zll = ( (XI * 22) + (X2 * ZI)) * ((XI * Z2) + (X2 * ZI) ) ;
***********************************************************************
% File - mdouble.m
% This is the montgomery double function used for point doubling
% Author - Aarti Malik
% Last Updated - 03/18/04
O
******************************* ****************************************
function [XI, ZI] = mdouble (X, Z,b)
XI = (X * X * X * X) + b k (Z * Z * Z * Z) ;
ZI = X * X * Z * Z;
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%**********************+***********************************************
% File - projtoaffine.m
% This function converts projective coordinates back to affine.
% Author - Aarti Malik
% Last Updated - 03/19/04
Q.
O
***********************************************************************
function [xk,yk] = projtoaffine (XI, Z1,X2, Z2,x, y)
xk = XI * inverse (ZI) ;
yk = ( (xk + x) * (X2* inverse (Z2) + x) + x*x + y) * ( (xk + x)*
inverse (x) + y) ;
***********************************************************************
% File - scalarmult.m
% This is the montgomery scalar multiplication algorithm for GF(2An)
% Author - Aarti Malik
% Last Updated - 03/25/04
"5
***********************************************************************
clear all;
x = gf (165,8,265) ; % Galois vector in GF(2A3)
y = gf (90,8,265) ;
k = gf ( [0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0] , 8, 265) ;
b = gf (43, 8, 265) ;
% Converting affine to projective coordinates.
Xl=x;
Zl=gf (1,8,265) ;
x2=x*x;
x4=x2*x2;
X2=x4 + b;
Z2=x2;
for 1=2:8
if (k(l) == 1)
[XI, ZI] = madd(Xl,Zl,X2,Z2,x) ;
[X2,Z2] = mdouble (X2,Z2,b) ;
else
[X2,Z2] = madd(X2,Z2,Xl,Zl,x) ;
[XI, ZI] = mdouble (XI, Zl,b) ;
end
end
[xk,yk] = projtoaffine(Xl,Zl,X2,Z2,x,y) ;
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Appendix B
ScalarMultiplication Instruction in Memory
Depth = 256;
Width = 32;
Address_radix = HEX;
Data_radix = HEX;
Content
Begin
[00.. FF] : 00000000;
00 : 8C0A0006
01 : 00000000
02 : 8C040002
03 : 82850000
04 : 8C090005
05 : 00000000
06 : 028A1020
07 : 00000000
08 : 00000000
09 : 80A70000
0A : 00E64020
0B : 0029A804
OC : 01204801
0D : 112A0021
0E : 00000000
OF : 11550010
10 : 00000000
-- WHEN K(i)
11 : 20455800
12 : 21046000
13 : 810D0000
14 : 80AE0000
15 : 216C7800
16 : 016C8020
17 : 21AE2800
18 : 81B10000
19 : 81CE0000
IA : 20CE9000
IB : 82040000
IC : 02324020
ID : 20949800
IE : 026F1020
IF : 100000EB
WHEN K(i) =
-- LOAD $10, 06 LOAD 10, 0
LOAD $3, 01 LOAD 3, Y
LOAD $4, 02 LOAD 4, 1 ZI
SQR $5, $20 XA2 Z2
LOAD $9, 05 LOAD 8, x40
8C140000; Load $20, 00 load 20, x
xor $2, $20, $10 load 2, x --X1
LOAD $6, 03 -- LOAD 6, B
LOAD $1, 04 LOAD 1, K
SQR $7, $5 XA4
XOR $8, $7, $6 XA4 + B X2
AND $21, $1, $9 -- AND n, k
SLR $9, $9
- BEQ $9, $10 ,2E
BEQ $21, $10, IE
-- MUL $11, $2, $5 MUL XI, Z2
MUL $12, $8, $4 MUL X2, ZI
SQR $13, $8 SQR X2
SQR $14, $5 SQR Z2
MUL $15, $11, $12 X1Z2X2Z1
XOR $16, $11, $12 X1Z2 + X2Z1
MUL $5, $13, $14 Z2 = X2A2 Z2A2
SQR $17, $13 -- XA4
SQR $14, $14 ZA4
MUL $18, $6, $14 bZA4
SQR $4, $16 sqr(XlZ2 + X2Z1)
XOR $8, $17, $18 -- XA4 + bZA4
MUL $19, $20, $4 sqr(XlZ2 + X2Z1) * x
XOR $2, $19, $15 sqr(XlZ2 + X2Z1) * x + X1Z2X2Z1
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20 : 20455800,
21 21046000,
22 804D0000,
23 808E0000,
24 216C7800,
25 016C8020,
26 21AE2000,
27 81B10000;
28 81CE0000;
29 20CE9000;
2A 82050000;
2B 02321020;
2C 22859800;
2D 01F34020;
xiz;!X2Z1
2E : 100000DC;
-- MUL $11, $2, $5 MUL XI, Z2
MUL $12, $8, $4 MUL X2, ZI
SQR $13, $2 SQR XI
SQR $14, $4 SQR ZI
MUL $15, $11, $12 X1Z2X2Z1
XOR $16, $11, $12 X1Z2 + X2Z1
MUL $4, $13, $14 ZI = X1A2 Z1A2
-- SQR $17, $13 XA4
SQR $14, $14 -- ZA4
MUL $18, $6, $14 bZA4
SQR $5, $16 Z2 = sqr(XlZ2 + X2Z1)
XOR $2, $17, $18 XA4 + bZA4
MUL $19, $20, $5 sqr(XlZ2 + X2Z1)
XOR $8, $15, $19 Z2 = sqr(XlZ2 + X2Z1) * x +
PROJECTIVE TO AFFINE
2F 408B0000;
30 40AC0000;
31 828D0000;
32 21627000;
33 210C7800;
34 006D8020;
35 01D45820;
36 01F46020;
37 42910000;
38 218B9000;
39 21719800;
3A 02505820;
3B 02636020;
3C 216C6800;
3D AC0E0007;
3E AC0D0008;
3F 8C190008;
40 8C180007;
INV $11, $4 1/Z1
INV $12, $5 1/Z2
SQR $13, $20 xA2
MUL $14, $11, $2 Xl/Zl - xK
MUL $15, $12, $8 -- X2/Z2
XOR $16, $13, $3 -- xA2 + y
XOR $11, $14, $20 Xl/Zl + x
XOR $12, $15, $20 -- X2/Z2 + x
INV $17, $20 --1/x
MUL $18, $12, $11 -- (Xl/Zl + x) (X2/Z2 + x)
MUL $19, $11, $17 (Xl/Zl + x)/x
XOR $11, $18, $16 (Xl/Zl + x) (X2/Z2 + x) + xA2 + y
XOR $12, $19, $3 (Xl/Zl + x)/x + y
MUL $13, $11, $12 yK storing this in 24
STORE $14, 07 - x
STORE $13, 08 - y
End;
